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Note
Competing Competitions: Anticompetitive
Conduct by Publisher-Controlled Esports
Leagues
Michael Arin
INTRODUCTION
The esports1 industry is maturing; with maturation comes
attention and regulation. At the same time, the esports industry
debates player compensation2 in light of increased value of
esports teams;3 professional player associations bargain for

 J.D. Candidate 2020 University of Minnesota Law School, Managing
Editor, Minnesota Law Review, 2019–20. Student Editor-in-Chief, Esports Bar
Association Journal, 2020. I would like to thank Susanna Blumenthal for her
guidance during the note-writing process, as well as members of the Esports
Bar Association for being a constant source of inspiration, discussion, and support. Of course, the Minnesota Law Review team also deserves high praise for
the work they do. Copyright © 2020 by Michael Arin.
1. The term esports has not been defined by either the federal government
or the states. Cf. Sports Wagering Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 5:12A-10 (West 2018)
(defining sports events as excluding “electronic sports”). As it will be used in
this Note, it is often considered the “organized and competitive playing of video
games.” Esports may fall into the definition of sports, which has many implications. See John T. Holden et al., The Future Is Now: Esports Policy Considerations and Potential Litigation, 27 J. LEGAL ASPECTS SPORT 46 (2017), for a definitional analysis and discussion of legal consequences of the classification
thereof as “sport.” See also infra Part I.A (arguing the classification argument
masks the complexity of issues in the antitrust context).
2. See Timothy Heggem, “It’s Complicated”: Analyzing the Potential for
Esports Players’ Unions, 6 ARIZ. ST. U. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 447 (2017); see also
Hunter A. Bayliss, Note, Not Just a Game: The Employment Status and Collective Bargaining Rights of Professional eSports Players, 22 WASH. & LEE J. CIV.
RTS. & SOC. JUST. 359, 394–407 (2016) (discussing bargaining rights obtained
by employee status).
3. See Christina Settimi, ‘Awful Business’ or the New Gold Rush? The Most
Valuable Companies in Esports Are Surging, FORBES (Nov. 5, 2019),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/christinasettimi/2019/11/05/awful-business-or
-the-new-gold-rush-the-most-valuable-companies-in-esports-are-surging
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standards and rights in their respective leagues;4 the Federal
Trade Commission explores regulation of tech-dependent markets like esports5 and investigates loot boxes commonly sold by
game publishers;6 Congress calls to reverse a politically-motivated ban of a professional esports player;7 and antitrust ques-

[https://perma.cc/VFU6-KXVF]; see also Jurre Pannekeet, Newzoo: Global Esports Economy Will Top $1 Billion for the First Time in 2019, NEWZOO (Feb. 12,
2019), https://newzoo.com/insights/articles/newzoo-global-esports-economy-will
-top-1-billion-for-the-first-time-in-2019 [https://perma.cc/9TPE-848S]. While
many Newzoo statistics are now viewed as not credible, the one-billion-dollar
estimate is incorporated by many as credible. See Cecilia D’Anastasio, Shady
Numbers and Bad Business: Inside the Esports Bubble, KOTAKU (May 23, 2019),
https://kotaku.com/as-esports-grows-experts-fear-its-a-bubble-ready-to-po
-1834982843 [https://perma.cc/C3HK-JA2T].
4. E.g., Devon Huge, The NA LCS Player’s Association Makes First Moves,
ESPORTZ NETWORK (Nov. 5, 2019), https://www.esportznetwork.com/esports-the
-nalcs-players-association-makes-first-moves [https://perma.cc/QQ6K-M3CK]
(discussing the player’s association for professionals in Riot Games’s league for
League of Legends). One of the first accomplishments of the NALCS Player’s
Association was to negotiate for players to be able to stream on official tournament servers. Id. Streaming means “any telecast, webcast, transmission, broadcast or distribution of video game content . . . to viewers not participating in the
particular streamed game (whether on a live, delayed, recorded or on-demand
basis) via any interface, channel, site, offering, network, application, device or
other platform.” OVERWATCH LEAGUE, PLAYER STREAMING POLICY § 2; see also
Streaming, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-webster
.com/dictionary/streaming [https://perma.cc/JCT2-C8MB] (defining streaming
as “the act, the process, or an instance of streaming data . . . or of accessing data
that is being streamed”). While this is a far cry from the issues that plagued
collective bargaining in traditional sports, it is a first and important step.
5. The FTC recently updated its intellectual property licensing guidelines
in 2017. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FTC, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (2017), https://www.justice.gov/atr/
IPguidelines/download [https://perma.cc/UH4T-3KET]; see also Cecilia Kang,
F.T.C. Hearings Add to Efforts that Threaten Tech Industry, N.Y. TIMES (Sept.
13, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/13/technology/ftc-hearings
-technology.html [https://perma.cc/M393-NUTE] (discussing antitrust reform in
light of technological advancements).
6. On August 7, 2019, the Federal Trade Commission held a public workshop on “consumer protection issues related to video game loot boxes.” See generally FTC, Inside the Game: Unlocking the Consumer Issues Surrounding Loot
Boxes (Aug. 7, 2019), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_events/
1511966/slides-loot-box-8-7-19.pdf [https://perma.cc/JWF6-N4F9] (slides from
panels).
7. Letter from the Congress of the United States to Robert Kotick, Chief
Executive Officer, Activision Blizzard 1 (Oct. 18, 2019), https://www.wyden
.senate.gov/download/101819-wyden-letter-to-activision-blizzard-re-hong-kong
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tions loom large in the distance as esports experiment with organizing competitions.8 Publishers controlling major esports
leagues modeled themselves after traditional sports leagues
thereby drawing the natural analogy in the antitrust context.
However, the existence of an intellectual rights-holder above
all—the game publisher—means that esports do not map perfectly onto sports and the precedents cannot be neatly applied.9
More specifically, largely ambiguous copyright protections afforded to game publishers garner significant attention, complicate the antitrust analysis and generate substantial risk for
investment in the nascent market.10 Highly-structured intellectual property strategy allows the game publisher to exert deep
downstream control over the esports market.11 Without attention and regulation, the publisher decides on the existence of the
market, for the publisher as copyright holder over the game has
exclusive control over the if, when, and how a game can be

[https://perma.cc/2RQZ-JDYU]; see also infra Part II.B.2.a (arguing player bans
for arbitrary or pretextual reasons, while permitted under copyright, may be
used to reduce competition).
8. See, e.g., Laura L. Chao, “You Must Construct Additional Pylons”:
Building a Better Framework for Esports Governance, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 737,
746–49, 755–56 (2017) (raising concerns for anticompetitive conduct in esports
based on mirroring of traditional sports); Max Miroff, Tiebreaker: An Antitrust
Analysis of Esports, 52 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 177 (2019) (analyzing tying
claims against publisher-controlled leagues).
9. See infra Part I.B.
10. See FOLEY & LARDNER, 2018 ESPORTS SURVEY REPORT 6–9 (2018),
https://www.foley.com/files/uploads/2018-Esports-Survey-Report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3MPQ-8NVH] (identifying, inter alia, intellectual property
rights and licensing issues as posing a substantial risk to the esports industry);
Matt Morris et al., Ten Legal Issues To Watch When It Comes to Esports, FORBES
(May 19, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/allabouttherupees/2017/05/19/ten
-legal-issues-to-watch-when-it-comes-to-esports/ [https://perma.cc/F75F
-78MG]. Although the industry is still considered “nascent,” the year 2019
marks the first time the global esports industry will be expected to surpass the
billion-dollar revenue mark, with $409.1 million coming from North America
alone. Pannekeet, supra note 3.
11. See Jochen Harttung, The Issue of “Deep Control” in Professional Esports—A Critical Analysis of Intellectual Property Structures in Electronic
Gaming (2015) (unpublished LL.M. thesis, University of Toronto), https://
tspace.library.utoronto.ca/bitstream/1807/70431/1/Harttung_Jochen_201511_
LLM_thesis.pdf [https://perma.cc/LQ5U-M9LX] (critiquing this deep control of
downstream markets based on ambiguity of United States copyright jurisprudence).
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streamed to others. The market is dependent upon a single actor:
a potential monopolist.12
Out of all the stakeholders in esports, independent tournament organizers are in the worst pinch.13 A case study of the
2013 Evolution Championship Series (EVO) best illustrates the
risks to such organizers. EVO represents the “largest and longest-running” fighting game tournament.14 Players pay an entry
fee to compete in games such as Super Smash Bros. Melee, a Nintendo fighting game, where contestants have the chance to win
prize money and, more importantly, recognition in the fighting
game community that could lead to sponsorship by a team or
company.15 In return, the tournament organizers have the opportunity to sell tickets, attract advertisers, and monetize the
end product: video game streams.16
However, video game tournaments are effectively economic
parasites, or symbionts, depending on the perspective. Without
the publisher’s game, there would be no tournament, no professional player, and no advertising. Therefore, when users—purchasers of the video game17—begin interacting with the intellectual property beyond the intended use18 and create user12. See generally Miroff, supra note 8 (determining that publishers represent potential monopolists of the esports market or the individual-game markets).
13. The independent organizer is highlighted as opposed to the game publisher organizer because, as explained in Part II, the copyright most likely falls
to the game publisher absent congressional, judicial, or contractual intervention.
14. EVO CHAMPIONSHIP SERIES, http://evo.shoryuken.com [https://perma
.cc/S98A-VAF6].
15. See Tournament Format, EVO CHAMPIONSHIP SERIES, http://evo
.shoryuken.com/tournament-format [https://perma.cc/3FUV-FMWW].
16. An Introduction to the Esports Ecosystem, ESPORTS OBSERVER, https://
esportsobserver.com/the-esports-eco-system [https://perma.cc/C25R-8SVG].
17. Video games are no longer solely products. John Breyault, Nat’l Consumers League, Making Money from GaaS: Consumer Protection in an Evolving
Video Game Industry, in Inside the Game, supra note 6, at 57–73. The greater
software-as-a-service phenomenon has gripped the video game industry forcing
publishers to commit significant resources to the maintenance of the original
product. See Sean F. Kane, Treasure or Trifle? A Macro Look at Microtransactions, in INSIDE THE GAME, supra note 6, at 2, 5–13. But it also allows the publishers to benefit from the longer lifespan through drip pricing (e.g., microtransactions) and organized competitive play. Breyault, supra note 17, at 61–63.
18. But see Andrew Webster, Why Competitive Gaming Is Starting To Look
a Lot Like Professional Sports, VERGE (July 27, 2018), https://www.theverge
.com/2018/7/27/17616532/overwatch-league-of-legends-nba-nfl-esports [https://
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generated content19 such as memes20 or streams,21 friction
sparks battle over ownership.22
In 2013, that friction led Nintendo to exercise its copyright
protections, call up the EVO organizers, and demand that the
tournament pull Super Smash Bros. Melee entirely.23 The organizers managed to negotiate that the game would be played, but
not broadcasted.24 But, when the announcement led to public
outcry, Nintendo ultimately relented and permitted the broadcast.25 As this situation illustrates, without such good-will arrangements or the current industry self-regulation favoring contractual symbiosis,26 tournament organizers are left exposed to
perma.cc/MB6F-93BH] (indicating that game publishers intended such competitive use).
19. See T.L. TAYLOR, WATCH ME PLAY: TWITCH AND THE RISE OF GAME
LIVE STREAMING 10 (2018) (describing user-generated content as the “interweaving of original creative material with existing intellectual property”).
20. A meme is defined as “an idea, behavior, style, or usage that spreads
from person to person within a culture” or “an amusing or interesting item (such
as a captioned picture or video) or genre of items that is spread widely online
especially through social media.” Meme, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/meme [https://perma.cc/KR6Q
-GVVR]. See generally Thomas F. Cotter, Memes and Copyright, 80 TUL. L. REV.
331 (2005) (discussing copyright implications of memes).
21. See supra note 4 (defining streaming).
22. Cf. TAYLOR, supra note 19, at 21–22, 212–18 (describing the tension between cultural innovation and existing legal frameworks).
23. Jenna Pitcher, Nintendo Wanted To Shut Down Super Smash Bros. Melee Evo Event, Not Just Stream, POLYGON (July 11, 2013), https://www
.polygon.com/2013/7/11/4513294/nintendo-were-trying-to-shut-down-evo-not
-just-super-smash-bros-melee [https://perma.cc/27ZJ-HYK6].
24. Id.
25. Steven Bogos, Nintendo Will Officially Sponsor the Next EVO Fighting
Tournament, ESCAPIST (July 6, 2014), https://www.escapistmagazine.com/news/
view/135927-Nintendo-Will-Officially-Sponsor-The-Next-EVO-Fighting
-Tournament [https://perma.cc/NW23-DUN2].
26. See, e.g., Dota 2 Tournament License and Paid Spectator Service Agreement, VALVE CORP., cdn.dota2.com/apps/dota2/leagues/league_terms.pdf
[https://perma.cc/SXH8-UGXT] (setting forth a contractual arrangement between independent tournament organizers and the game publisher). While
Valve is not unique in providing a Tournament License, the competitive scene
around Valve’s products, namely Dota 2, does not conform to the traditional
league structure. Cf. Vlad Savov, Dota 2 Is the World’s Richest E-Sport, So Why
Aren’t Its Players Happy?, VERGE (May 13, 2015), https://www.theverge.com/
2015/5/13/8597121/dota-2-professional-gaming-tournaments-the-international
[https://perma.cc/VU9K-PQMZ] (noting how Valve is unique for having “laissezfaire principles” that have resulted in the “fragmentation of its self-organizing
competitive scene”). Valve has provided some structure with the major/minor

1590

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[104:1585

high liability should any game publisher enforce its copyright
protections. Coupled with the growing trend of publisher-controlled leagues27 wherein the entity that holds the rights to the
game also partakes in the monetization of the competitive scene,
circumstances like this raise alarming concerns over anticompetitive practices and threatened monopolization. With a series
of DMCA28 takedown notices, player bans, or license revocations,
the game publisher could defeat any competing leagues thereby
gaining a monopoly over their title’s viewership.
This Note highlights the problematic rise of publisher-controlled leagues that can manipulate deep control29 over video
game copyright protections to engage in anticompetitive practices seen in traditional sports leagues. Part I begins by discussing the concept of “sportsification”—the application of sports economics to video games so as to produce a competitive scene. This
leads to a discussion, first, of the video games and underlying
copyright protections afforded to game publishers and the limits
on licensing these rights. Next, it details the economic structure
of traditional sports markets, antitrust law’s rocky history with
sports, and a critique of the competitive balance argument. Finally, Part I explains esports (the mix of video games and
sports), recognizes the antitrust questions left unexplored, and
focuses on the problem of publisher-controlled leagues.
Part II then identifies the problem in copyright law wherein
limits to licensing are recognized but ill-defined, thereby allowing publishers to experiment with control over downstream markets. It then delineates (relatively) bright-line antitrust problems found in traditional sports history and pairs them to
system, but this deviates from the single-tournament structure championed by
traditional sports like basketball, football, and baseball.
27. The publisher may not be the actual league operator. Generally, an entity separate from the publisher operates the league; however, the two appear
to be integrated in fact. See Bayliss, supra note 2, at 364 (discussing the questionable separation between Riot Games, the publisher of League of Legends,
and the North American League of Legends Championship Series, the league
operator).
28. Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112
Stat. 2860 (codified in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C. (2018)).
29. Harttung, supra note 11, at 46, uses the term “deep control” to describe
the game publisher’s control over other stakeholders in the downstream esports
market such as tournament organizers, teams, and players. Because it resonates in the intellectual property and antitrust contexts, it will be used throughout this Note to refer to the same concept.
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traditional licensing arrangements in order to show that the economic practices by publisher-controlled leagues are paradoxically legitimate exercises of copyright and unreasonable restraints on sports competition. Part II focuses on four practices:
controlling pool of potential players through bans, territorial allocation through field of use restrictions, restricting supply of esports content through pooled broadcasting rights, and restricting
supply of esports content to consumers through pure exclusivity
and refusal to deal. In the end, this paradox leaves a fragile status quo reliant on the shaky system of publisher-regulation
while the market grows.
Finally, Part III proposes a statutory solution based, in part,
on the Music Modernization Act (MMA).30 After discussing why
online music streaming serves as an imperfect model for a solution to publisher-controlled leagues, Part III begins to outline
the necessary elements of a so-called Esports Competition Modernization Act. In order to run a tournament, the game publishers would opt-in to a compulsory licensing scheme upon registration of the work with the Copyright Office. Upon opting-in, any
tournament organizer could benefit from the irrevocable statutory license for competitive play, so long as they abide by the
conditions set forth therein, including payment to the publisher
of a royalty based on tournament revenue. A minimally-invasive
rate setting board would facilitate collection and distribution of
royalties between publishers and independent tournament organizers. In essence, this system ensures that a publisher may
only have a league or operate a tournament on the same playing
field as independent operators—competing competitions. And, in
the end, the competing competitions solution serves as a better
alternative to regulatory oversight, changes to copyright law, or
reliance on antitrust law, each of which suffer from critical flaws.
I. ESPORTS: SPORTS & ENTERTAINMENT
Part I will discuss the three foundational pillars of esports
antitrust concerns arising from the surge in publisher-controlled
leagues: video games as copyright-protected entertainment,
league structures as the keystone of sports economics, and esports—the market around the competitive playing of video
30. Orrin G. Hatch-Bob Goodlatte Music Modernization Act, Pub. L. No.
115-264, 132 Stat. 3676 (2018) (codified in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.
(2018)).
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games. The pillars stem from the central debate in esports academic literature: the classification of esports as sports or entertainment.31 This Note recognizes the importance of the distinction but favors the concept of sportsification—the application of
sports economics to video games. To be more exact, publishers
are able to use their intellectual property rights over their video
games to control a league and reproduce even anticompetitive
sports practices.
Video games form the core of the esports industry, and the
second portion of Part I outlines the copyright protections over
video games. First, ambiguous copyright protections afforded to
game publishers lead to deep and downstream control over other
stakeholders in esports.32 While antitrust law places theoretical
limits on uses of copyright rights, those limits are relatively unexplored by the courts. Instead, creative licensing strategies allow the publisher to significantly manipulate the market and potential competitors.33 Some markets, such as music, have found
solutions to antitrust concerns with intellectual property licensing through compulsory licensing schemes.34
Esports used traditional sports as a model to monetize on
the competitive play of those copyright-protected video games.
The third portion of Part I tracks the economic structure of
sports,35 the antitrust concerns from the 1950s onwards,36 and
antitrust law’s unspoken assumption that competitive balance is
achieved by a single championship.37 The mirrored business
models of sports and esports largely grounded in self-regulation
lead to the same economic concerns highlighted in the 1950s
Congressional hearings on monopolistic tendencies in sports and
after: regional monopolies, bottlenecking players from entering
competing leagues, pooled broadcast rights, and pure exclusivity.

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

See infra Part I.A.
See infra Part I.B.1.
See infra Part I.B.2.
See infra Part I.B.2.
See infra Part I.C.1.
See infra Part I.C.2.
See infra Part I.C.3.
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Finally, the fourth portion of Part I explains the current economic practices in the esports industry, the different stakeholders, and the growing concern for anticompetitive conduct.38 In
particular, this Note focuses on the economic practices giving
rise to antitrust concerns in the sports context.39 In the end,
many questions about the application of antitrust to esports are
left as unexplored territory.40 Max Miroff and, to a lesser extent,
Laura Chao have addressed antitrust in esports, but this Note is
the first to tie together esports intellectual property concerns resulting from publisher-controlled leagues to readily-identifiable
anticompetitive sports economics.41
A. ESPORTS: SPORTS OR ENTERTAINMENT?
Esports is the competitive playing of video games.42 The evolution of esports is relatively short but spans the history of video
games. The first organized competitive playing of video games
occurred via arcade machines during the 1970s and 1980s.43
During that time, competition took place through high scores,
though a few games, such as Pong,44 introduced concurrent competitive play.45 Yet play was localized and competition was inherently limited to those physically present.46 The second wave
of esports, spanning from the 1990s to 2010, crystalized as the
cost of bandwidth went down, thereby allowing players to connect online.47 During this time, games like StarCraft (1998),
38. See infra Part I.D.1.
39. There are other antitrust concerns with player unionization. See, e.g.,
Harris Peskin, Unionization in Esports, ESPORTS B. ASS’N J., Oct. 2019, https://
esportsbar.org/journals/2019/9/11/unionization-in-esports [https://perma.cc/
D48A-RWYS] (discussing antitrust concerns with mandatory salary caps and
collective bargaining).
40. See infra Part I.D.2.
41. See infra Part I.D.3.
42. Holden et al., supra note 1, at 47–48.
43. TAYLOR, supra note 19, at 4.
44. Pong is a game where players control a paddle guarding a goalpost.
Atari PONG, CTR. FOR COMPUTING HIST., http://www.computinghistory.org.uk/
det/4007/Atari-PONG/ [https://perma.cc/HPX2-5EBP]. A ball bounces around
the screen and the player tries to get the ball into the opposing player’s goalpost.
Id.
45. See T.L. TAYLOR, RAISING THE STAKES: E-SPORTS AND THE PROFESSIONALIZATION OF COMPUTER GAMING 184 (2012).
46. See TAYLOR, supra note 19, at 4.
47. See id.; Dean Takahashi, Team Liquid’s Steve Arhancet Tells Us How
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Counter Strike (2000), and Defense of the Ancients (DOTA)
(2003)48 invited players to compete against other human players
repeatedly and consistency of performance began to matter.49
However, latency issues with online connectivity forced competitive play to remain relatively localized at Local Area Network
(LAN) tournaments.50 With early adopters of the Internet often
attending these LAN events, networking nevertheless allowed
for the formation of a true esports industry largely modeled after
traditional sports.51 But it was Twitch52 that unshackled esports
from its locality in 2011 and made esports truly a global phenomenon.53 Twitch is a live streaming site that serves as a platform
for esports: the world can tune in instantly.54 The growth of live
streaming transformed esports from merely competitive play—

To Run an Esports Team, VENTUREBEAT (Apr. 28, 2017), https://venturebeat
.com/2017/04/28/team-liquids-steve-arhancet-tells-us-how-to-run-an-esports
-team/ [https://perma.cc/6XRT-JQYN].
48. Games such as Pong are limited in connectivity. See Atari PONG, supra
note 44. The second wave introduced concurrent and competitive online play
where success was not found in beating a computer but in beating another person or even another team. See Takahashi, supra note 47.
49. See generally ROLAND LI, GOOD LUCK HAVE FUN: THE RISE OF ESPORTS
(2016) (discussing the evolution of competitive playing of videogames).
50. LAN tournaments are those which operate on a single localized network
spanning no more than a couple buildings and most often confined to a single
room. See Local Area Network, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, https://www
.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/local%20area%20network [https://perma.cc/
KBW5-XSY8].
51. Traditional sports shall be used to refer to baseball, football, and basketball collectively. While others, such as soccer, should fall well within the definition, these sports stand apart because of congressional and judicial scrutiny.
See e.g., Sports Broadcasting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1291 (2012) (applying to “organized professional team sports of football, baseball, basketball, [and] hockey,”
but not soccer).
52. Twitch.tv is an online streaming platform designed with esports in
mind. See TAYLOR, supra note 19, at 3–4. Users can broadcast their play online
directly to other users who can interact and comment in the chat. Id. Most esports tournaments are broadcast through Twitch today, though some companies
such as Valve (Steam.tv), Microsoft (Mixer), and even Facebook (Facebook Gaming) are attempting to take a slice of the pie. See, e.g., Catherine Ellis, Facebook
Challenges Twitch with Exclusive Esports Streaming Deal, TECHRADAR (Jan.
23, 2018), https://www.techradar.com/news/facebook-challenges-twitch-with
-exclusive-esports-streaming-deal [https://perma.cc/5AGD-KS4K].
53. TAYLOR, supra note 19, at 4.
54. Id. at 3–4.

2020]

ESPORTS

1595

as T.L. Taylor puts it, a “sports product”—into media entertainment,55 from a niche and ancillary market to a motive for video
game creation.56
But therein lies the question: are esports sports or entertainment? The rise of esports triggered a vigorous debate over
whether these games should legally be considered sports and cemented the comparison as the starting point of all analysis.57 On
the one hand, esports is entertainment. Esports rely on media
rights to monetize,58 depend on online consumer spectatorship
compared to in-person attendance,59 and stem from video games
that were, at one point, only considered entertainment.60 On the
other hand, esports are modeled after sports. Even if society may
reject esports as sport,61 the leagues have the same economic
stakeholders one would find in a sports league.62
Maybe more importantly, the distinction is relevant legally.
Sports are treated differently at the federal and state levels. For
example, in gaming law the Professional and Amateur Sports

55. Id. at 4.
56. Consider the string of games since 2016 that have branded themselves,
from the very release, as esports titles: Overwatch (2016), Fortnite (2017), and
PlayerUnknown’s Battlegrounds (PUBG) (2017). See Webster, supra note 18 (“It
was a unique opportunity in that it was Blizzard’s first new [intellectual property] in 17 years, and so we were building this new IP, this new game franchise.
It was an opportunity to build something from the beginning of the game’s
lifecycle. . . . [W]e thought, well, ‘How do we build the entire ecosystem around
competitive Overwatch?’”).
57. See generally Holden et al., supra note 1 (discussing the classification
of esports as sports).
58. See infra Parts I.B., I.D.
59. Robert Elder, The Esports Audience Is Escalating Quickly, BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 20, 2017), https://www.businessinsider.com/the-esports-audience
-is-escalating-quickly-2017-3 [https://perma.cc/7SD6-WPL7] (comparing
173,000 in-person attendees to 46 million unique viewers online). Of course,
sports also rely on broadcasting, which is closer to the esports viewership experience.
60. See supra notes 42–56 (discussing the evolution of esports); infra Part
I.B; see also Gary Larson, The Far Side: Hopeful Parents, WASH. POST, Oct. 15,
1990, at B12 (depicting two parents imagining a future where their son can
make money from his video game hobby).
61. For most people, there is not the same physical element—gross motor
skills such as running, lifting, or throwing. See generally Holden et al., supra
note 1 (discussing the physical activity involved in esports).
62. See also infra Part I.D.1.
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Protection Act once regulated sports betting;63 now states have
taken up this mantle.64 The Wire Act exempts sporting events or
contests from its prohibition on wagering.65 In terms of education, integrating esports into existing collegiate sports has implications for Title IX balance in colleges.66 Some sports have even
received antitrust exemptions in regards to pooled broadcasting
rights.67 Finally, courts and regulators looking at the esports industry will analogize to the sports and entertainment industries
in the antitrust context.68 Therefore, it is necessary to consider
the entertainment (intellectual property) and sports antitrust
jurisprudence surrounding each.
B. ENTERTAINMENT: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTIONS
OF VIDEO GAMES
If esports have modeled themselves after traditional sports
economics, the defining quality distinguishing the two is the intellectual property rights held by the game publisher.69 Put another way: no one owns the game of football, but someone owns
games like Overwatch.70 The National Football League lacks the
capacity, both legally and physically, to stop or otherwise place
conditions on every group that would like to play football, ranging from recognized state high school conferences to a collection
of neighborhood kids playing a pickup game. But Blizzard is legally well within its rights to prevent players or entire leagues
from playing Overwatch, and Blizzard can effectively enforce
those bans with just the click of a mouse. This Part first looks to
United States copyright law that has evolved to protect creative
works like video games.71 Then, it will be shown that the courts
63. 28 U.S.C. §§ 3701–3704 (2012), declared unconstitutional by Murphy v.
Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461 (2018).
64. E.g., Sports Wagering Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 5:12A-10 to -19 (West
2018) (defining sports events as excluding “electronic sports”).
65. 18 U.S.C. § 1084 (2012); see also 18 U.S.C. § 224 (2012) (criminalizing
“bribery in sporting contests”).
66. See Holden et al., supra note 1, at 56–59.
67. Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961, 15 U.S.C. § 1291 (2012).
68. See, e.g., Miroff, supra note 8.
69. Id. at 179–80.
70. Id. Activision Blizzard is the publisher of Overwatch, a team-based
first-person shooter. About, ACTIVISION BLIZZARD, https://overwatchleague
.com/en-us/about [https://perma.cc/9GTJ-9AL4].
71. See generally 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–805 (2018) (codifying copyright laws in
the United States).
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have failed to examine the exact protections available to video
game rights holders, thereby leaving the industry to play at the
fringes through self-regulation. Strategic licensing agreements
take advantage of this ambiguity progress game publisher control, possibly in excess of actual rights. Finally, this Part highlights the limitations on intellectual property licensing set forth
by courts and the black letter law, including antitrust concerns
and compulsory licensing schema.
1. Copyright Protections of Video Games: Protection,
Exclusive Rights, and Licensing
The game publisher creates a video game, sometimes with
the monetization of interactive entertainment in mind; to
achieve this, the publisher sells or licenses intellectual property
rights.72 The assets produced through the game creation process
can be protected through patents (e.g. systems or overlays for
spectatorship73), trademarks (e.g. game names or iconic
phrases), and trade secrets (e.g. game balance process74). However, in the end, video games are largely protected via copyright.75 Copyrightable materials are “original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression.”76 They do not
include any “idea, procedure, process, system, methods of operation, concept, principle, or discovery.”77 Although video games
72. See supra note 56. Miroff, supra note 8, at 215, generally disagrees with
the development-incentivization argument, citing the disproportionate revenue
generated from esports relative to game sales. However, even if it is a secondary
consideration, copyright law seeks to promote that innovation. U.S. CONST. art.
1, § 8, cl. 8 (“To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries.”).
73. E.g., Video Game System with Spectator Mode HUD, U.S. Patent No.
9,878,252 (filed July 26, 2016). This patent is for an overlay that is used to enhance the viewership experience of online spectators for the game of League of
Legends. Id.
74. The process behind making changes to the game is a highly guarded
secret of each publisher. See Kyle E. Conklin, Trade Secrets in the Video Game
Industry, OBER|KALER: IP WATCH (May 22, 2009), https://www.jdsupra.com/
legalnews/trade-secrets-in-the-video-game-industry-44015/ [https://perma.cc/
S8M6-8PY7]. Finding game balance that keeps players playing and viewers interested is the key to selling the game and its related esports content.
75. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(6) (2012); Midway Mfg. Co. v. Artic Int’l, Inc., 704
F.2d 1009, 1011 (7th Cir. 1983).
76. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
77. Id. § 102(b).
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are not listed among the eight categories of works under 17
U.S.C. § 102, courts have interpreted “literary works” to include
the underlying computer code and “motion pictures and other
audiovisual works”78 to protect the audiovisual content of video
games.79
Copyright attaches at the fixation of the work. A work is
fixed when “its embodiment in a copy . . . is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory duration.”80 Courts recognize fixation of the audiovisual work when
the game is permanently embodied in memory devices from
which they can be perceived with the aid of the other components
of the game—i.e., the console and television.81
Once attached, copyright protects the game’s “story, characters, imagined environments and geographic locations, music,
graphics . . . [and] the entire game.”82 Courts have also interpreted the copyright to extend to every single iteration of the
gameplay while recognizing that.83 Arguably, because the game
publisher has intellectual property rights over every possible iteration of gameplay, those rights equally extend to online performance of the games through streaming, despite any interactivity by the player.84
78. See, e.g., League of Legends, COPYRIGHT.GOV, https://www.copyright
.gov/ (follow “Search Copyright Records” hyperlink; then search “League of Legends” in Basic Search; select copyright number PA0002065995) [https://perma
.cc/L4SY-JCP8] (showing copyright for the game League of Legends filed, most
recently, under “motion picture”).
79. Kyle Coogan, Let’s Play: A Walkthrough of Quarter-Century-Old Copyright Precedent as Applied to Modern Video Games, 28 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP.
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 381, 385–86 (2018).
80. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
81. Stern Electronics, Inc. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852, 856 (2d. Cir. 1982).
82. S. GREGORY BOYD ET AL., VIDEO GAME LAW 21 (2019).
83. Midway Mfg. Co., v. Artic Int’l, Inc., 704 F.2d 1009, 1011 (7th Cir. 1983)
(“The question is whether the creative effort in playing a video game is enough
like writing or painting to make each performance of a video game the work of
the player and not the game’s inventor. We think it is not.”). But see Ryan
Fairchild, Thirty-Five Years Without Player Rights in Gameplay, ESPORTS B.
ASS’N J., Oct. 2019, https://esportsbar.org/journals/2019/9/11/player-rights-ingameplay [https://perma.cc/MF99-624B] (arguing that the interactivity argument is becoming more convincing).
84. See generally Elizabeth Brusa, Comment, Professional Video Gaming:
Piracy that Pays, 49 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 217 (2015) (analyzing the potentially
infringing content of real-time streaming, archived video, tutorials, and walk-
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The exclusive rights of a copyright owner are enumerated in
17 U.S.C. § 106. Particular to the esports context are the rights
of reproduction,85 derivative works,86 and public performance.87
Reproduction rights protect against exact or substantial copying.88 Derivative works are those “based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a . . . motion picture version, . . . art reproduction, . . . or any other form in which a work may be recast,
transformed, or adapted.”89 Common derivative works include
translations, motion picture adaptations of literary materials,
and new software versions of an existing computer program.90
An author of a derivative work gains copyrights in the enhancement or additions only, provided that the author of the preexisting work duly authorized the author.91 Finally, the right to perform publicly is to “recite, render, play, dance, or act [a
work] . . . or, in the case of a motion picture or other audiovisual
work, to show its images in any sequence” at “a place open to the
public or at any place where a substantial number of persons
outside of a normal circle of a family . . . is gathered.”92 These
exclusive rights are turned into a final product in the esports
market—video game live-play or streams. The author may exclude all others from capitalizing on these rights; exclusivity is
the copyright owner’s greatest advantage.
One means of enforcing exclusivity is through the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA)93 takedown procedure. On
throughs of video gameplay). See also infra Part II.B, for an examination of the
control exercised by publisher-controlled leagues.
85. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1).
86. Id. § 106(2).
87. Id. § 106(4).
88. Atari, Inc. v. North American Philips Consumer Electronics Corp., 672
F.2d 607, 618 (7th Cir. 1982), superseded by statute on other grounds, FED.
R. CIV. P. 52(a) (clarifying that courts should apply the “clearly erroneous” test
in reviewing findings of fact by the court).
89. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
90. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, CIRCULAR 14: COPYRIGHT IN DERIVATIVE
WORKS AND COMPILATIONS 1 (2013).
91. Id. at 2.
92. 17 U.S.C. § 101; see Red Baron-Franlkin Park, Inc. v. Taito Corp., 883
F.2d 275, 278–79 (4th Cir. 1989) (concluding that playing a pay-for-play arcade
machine constitutes a public performance); Valve Corp. v. Sierra Entm’t, 431 F.
Supp. 2d 1091, 1098 (W.D. Wash 2004) (extending Red Baron to playing a game
at a cyber-café).
93. Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112
Stat. 2860 (codified as amended at scattered sections of 17 U.S.C. (2018)).
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the one hand, the DMCA provides a safe harbor for online service
providers (e.g. Twitch) in the event users upload infringing content.94 On the other hand, online service providers are obligated
to take down content upon receiving a notice of infringement—
the online equivalent of a cease-and-desist—from the rights
holder.95 In the video game context, publishers have issued
DMCA takedown notices in response to online videos when users
fail to obtain a license.96 This is an important defensive mechanism available to publishers to enforce their copyright exclusivity.
Copyright holders can also engage in various forms of strategy other than enforcing the exclusivity of their rights. The
rights holder has the ability to sell the property, license the property, collaborate with competitors and customers to enhance the
property, or even give it away.97 Licensing property includes dividing up the intellectual property by right (only authorizing the
making of derivative works, but not the performance thereof) or
by field of use restrictions (limiting geography, use, product,
etc.).98 Through careful licensing, publishers can sell individual
or grouped parts of the copyright, like separating the rights to
make a movie and the rights to make a comic book based on the
video game world and characters. In fact, through strategic licensing, the possibilities are nearly limitless.
2. Lacking Limitations to Video Game Licensing
What is less clear is what copyright holders cannot do.99
Video game publishers cannot control their intellectual property

94. Id. § 512(c).
95. Id. § 512(c)(1)(C).
96. E.g., Dan Hagen, Fair Use, Fair Play: Video Game Performances and
“Let’s Plays” as Transformative Use, 13 WASH. J.L. TECH. & ARTS 245, 253–54,
257–58 (2018) (describing takedown notices, particularly those issued by Nintendo against the EVO Fighting Games Championships and Let’s Plays on
YouTube).
97. William W. Fisher III & Felix Oberholzer-Gee, Strategic Management
of Intellectual Property: An Integrated Approach, 55 CAL. MGMT. REV. 157, 159–
68 (2013).
98. Tyler Maddry, The Shifting Subject Matter of IP Licensing, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LICENSING STRATEGIES: LEADING LAWYERS ON ANALYZING
TRENDS IN IP LICENSING AND DRAFTING EFFECTIVE AGREEMENTS 10–12 (2016).
99. But see Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 780 F. Supp.
1283, 1290 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (“Copyright protection does not accord a copyright
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in four relevant instances: other copyrights, fair use, copyright
misuse, and compulsory licenses. Most of these limitations are
ill defined and provide little assistance in determining legitimate
boundaries of a publisher’s control over its intellectual assets.
First, video game publishers cannot control the copyrights
of others. The courts in the 1980s faced the argument that players should receive copyright over their individual performances
of the game.100 This independent interactivity argument best
presented in Midway Manufacturing Co. v. Artic International,
Inc.101 is seeing a resurgence in light of complex gameplay by the
players.102 Players increasingly contribute to the outcome of the
game—including possibly exceeding intended game play, e.g.,
exploitation of bugs—and that original and fixed performance

owner complete control over all possible uses of the protected work.”), aff’d, 704
F.2d 1009 (9th Cir. 1992)
100. Atari Games Corp v. Oman, 888 F.2d 878, 880 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (reversing denial of copyright registration by author of game when Register of Copyrights erroneously said that the audiovisual elements are “created randomly by
the player and not by the author of the video game”); Midway Mfg. Co., v. Artic
Int’l, Inc., 704 F.2d 1009 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 823 (1983); see
also Williams Electronics, Inc. v. Artic Int’l, Inc., 685 F.2d 870 (3d Cir. 1982). In
essence, the interactivity argument suggests that people, in playing the video
game, control the sequence of images on the screen in such a way that their
original and fixed performance is the first fixation and should, at the very least,
merit copyright protection as a co-author of the performance. Williams Electronics, 685 F.2d at 874. The argument was rejected because
[p]laying a video game is more like changing channels on a television
than it is like writing a novel or painting a picture . . . [the player] cannot create any sequence he wants out of the images stored on the
game’s circuit boards. The most he can do is choose one of the limited
number of sequences the game allows him to choose.
Midway Mfg. Co., 704 F.2d at 1012. While this may have been true for the game
at issue, Pac-Man, this is less true for popular games today like Fortnite or
Minecraft.
101. Midway Mfg. Co., 704 F.2d 1009.
102. Tori Allen, Note, What’s in a Game: Collective Management Organizations and Video Game Copyright, 8 U. NEV. L.V. GAMING L.J. 209, 215 (2018)
(arguing that user-generated content could result in copyrightable works);
Fairchild, supra note 83 (“While courts to date have effectively held that video
game players have no copyrights in their gameplay, those decisions derive from
games like Pac-Man and Galaxian, which bear little resemblance to contemporary games. With the rise of increasing video game complexity, more sophisticated play, and new judicial tests involving copyrights in software output, a legal window may be opening for a player or influencer to challenge old
precedent.”).
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may result in copyrights, either as independent works, co-authored works or authorized derivative works.103 However, such
arguments have consistently been rejected.
Second, video game publishers cannot control fair use of the
intellectual property. Designed to encourage creative activity for
the public good, fair use is a defense to infringement of copyright
that excuses particular conduct, such as criticism, comment, and
teaching, or conduct passing muster after an analysis of the purpose of the use, the nature of the work, the amount used, and the
effect of the use on the market.104 This argument suggests that
players contribute significant creative effort in the creation of
the esports content so as to transform the game during the
stream to such a high degree that it no longer qualifies as infringing.105 But there do not appear to be any cases claiming to
extend fair use to any play.
Next, antitrust—through the doctrine of copyright misuse—
provides a third limitation. Despite the seeming paradox of exclusivity and antitrust law’s promotion of competition, the two
laws “are complementary efforts to promote an efficient marketplace and long-run, dynamic competition through innovation.”106

103. Dan L. Burk, Owning E-Sports: Proprietary Rights in Professional Computer Gaming, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1535, 1548–50 (2013) (raising possibility of
independent copyrights based on increased interactivity, expressing skepticism
towards any intent to create a joint work, and finding the play by players to
constitute an authorized derivative work as most plausible); Allen, supra note
102, at 218.
104. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2018); Allen v. Acad. Games League of Am., 89 F.3d
614, 616 (9th Cir. 1996) (implying in dicta that “[e]ven if the playing of a board
game could be classified as public performance under copyright law, the ‘performance’ of the games by tournament organizers would constitute fair use”); Valve
Corp. v. Sierra Entm’t Inc., 431 F. Supp. 2d 1091 (W.D. Wash 2004) (declining
to extend Academic Games to games at a cyber-café); Hagen, supra note 96.
105. Hagen, supra note 96, at 265–71 (arguing that Let’s Plays—a “recording
of gameplay footage made for the benefit of an audience”—are fair use of a game
publisher’s copyright); Jihan Joo, Note, Public Video Gaming as Copyright Infringement, 39 AM. INTELL. PROP. L. ASS’N Q.J. 563, 601 (2011) (arguing competitive and communal video gaming are fair use of a game publisher’s copyright).
106. HERBERT HOVENKAMP ET AL., IP AND ANTITRUST: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 1–14 (3d ed.
2018) (quoting Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., 897 F.2d 1572, 1576 (Fed.
Cir. 1990)).
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Copyright misuse, borrowed from the doctrine of patent misuse,107 is a defense to infringement claiming that the copyright
holder has exceeded the monopoly provided by the copyright.108
If the “copyright is being used in a manner violative of the public
policy embodied in the grant of a copyright,” then the holder may
be estopped from claiming infringement.109 This does not necessarily mean that the copyright is used in violation of the antitrust laws—the doctrine extends beyond that—but violations of
antitrust are likely examples of misuse.110 Regardless, the ambiguous language of “violative of the public policy” has not been
well-clarified by the courts and provides little guidance for copyright holders.111
Finally, certain industries, like music, have responded to licensing difficulties through statutes imposing compulsory licensing.112 Music, like video games, is equally protected by copyright.113 It is complex and involves a number of different
107. Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 973 (4th Cir. 1990)
(finding a defense of copyright misuse predicated upon the defense of patent
misuse). Unlike patent misuse, copyright misuse did not find much success in
the courts. Victoria Smith Ekstrand, Protecting the Public Policy Rationale of
Copyright: Reconsidering Copyright Misuse, 11 COMM. L. & POL’Y 565, 579
(2006) (finding only three successful defenses out of the thirty-two attempts between 1990 and 2006).
108. Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 976. Patent misuse stemmed from concerns that
patents would be used to restrain competition for items not covered by the patent. Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 491–93 (1942), abrogated in part by Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006) (holding that the mere fact that a product is patented does not support a presumption
of market power). Four circuits extended the same logic to copyrights by recognizing the limitation to copyright use contrary to the public policy of the original
grant in U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 8: to “promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts.” See also Video Pipeline v. Buena Vista Home Entm’t, 342 F.3d 191,
2014 (3d Cir. 2003); Alcatel USA, Inc. v. DGI Tech., Inc., 166 F.3d 772, 793 (5th
Cir. 1999); Practice Mgmt. Info. Corp. v. Am. Med. Ass’n, 121 F.3d 516, 518 (9th
Cir. 1997); Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 975.
109. Ekstrand, supra note 107, at 575 (quoting Lasercomb Am., Inc., 911
F.2d at 970).
110. Id.
111. See also Thomas Cotter, Misuse, 44 HOUS. L. REV. 901, 925–32 (2007)
(analyzing inconsistent standards for copyright misuse).
112. See generally U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, CIRCULAR 73A: COMPULSORY LICENSING FOR MAKING AND DISTRIBUTING PHONORECORDS (2019), https://www
.copyright.gov/circs/circ73.pdf [https://perma.cc/UB28-NALM] (outlining the
compulsory license for making and distributing phonorecords in 17 U.S.C. § 115
(2018)).
113. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(7).
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licenses including composition (whose author is the composer,
but whose owner may be the publisher) and sound recording
(whose author is the performer) licenses.114 When streaming services like Spotify and Apple Music want to purchase these licenses en masse, the streaming service first negotiates for the
performance rights of the composition with performance rights
organizations115 before negotiating rates with record labels (publishers) for the sound recording license.116 These groups can always decline to license the rights. In contrast, the streaming service can automatically get a license to the reproduction of the
composition of the song via Section 115 of the Copyright Act of
1976, provided that the streaming service follows the conditions
thereof, i.e., pays a royalty rate set by statute.117 These compulsory licenses were also modified and facilitated by the Music
Modernization Act. A compulsory license is a significant limitation to the rights holder’s control over the use of its intellectual
property, but the blunt tool of compulsory licenses are not used
in the law often.
C. SPORTS: LEAGUE STRUCTURES AND ANTICOMPETITIVE
ECONOMICS
To learn how to monetize the copyright rights in a competitive context, esports game publishers looked to traditional
sports. This Section first identifies the parties necessary to create the sports league whose goal is to deliver the end product of
114. Sarah Jeong, A $1.6 Billion Spotify Lawsuit Is Based on a Law Made
for Player Pianos, VERGE (Mar. 14, 2018), https://www.theverge.com/2018/3/
14/17117160/spotify-mechanical-license-copyright-wixen-explainer [https://
perma.cc/X3ES-UGNX].
115. Performers naturally have an incentive to come together to sell a betterbundled product—a pooled license to hundreds of songs by different artists.
However, pooled licensing agreements have frequently been challenged in the
courts due to their anticompetitive nature. E.g., Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia
Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 18–19 (1979); Alden-Rochelle, Inc. v. ASCAP, 80
F. Supp. 888, 890 (S.D.N.Y. 1948) (regarding pooled copyrighted music); see also
infra Part I.C.2 (discussing pooled licensing arrangements in sports). While the
complex antitrust exceptions and regulatory regime for music are beyond the
scope of this Note, they nevertheless cloud any attempt to borrow ideas from the
music industry.
116. Michelle Castillo, Spotify IPO Filing Reveals How Insanely Complicated
It Is To License Music Rights, CNBC: TECH DRIVERS (Apr. 27, 2018),
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/02/28/how-spotify-licenses-and-pays-for-music
-rights.html [https://perma.cc/8FV5-SWN6].
117. 17 U.S.C. § 115(c).
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competition amongst the teams. Next, this Section looks at how
the collaboration among competitors in these joint ventures naturally triggers antitrust concerns. However, sports ventures
have justified anticompetitive conduct based on the practice’s
benefit to competitive balance. In the end, sports antitrust jurisprudence identifies anticompetitive practices, but often rationalizes them under a critiquable competitive balance argument.
1. Structures of Sports and Esports Leagues
To best understand the current economic circumstances of
the esports industry, it is important to first discuss the economic
structure of traditional sports leagues. In order for the market
for competitive sports to exist, there must be some form of cooperation between two entities (teams).118 When teams come together to play, they are in the unique position of cooperative competitors. In the antitrust context, the entity they create is known
as a joint venture.119 The joint venture is not inherently a separate firm, but an agreement to operate and decide cooperative
policy in tandem.
Teams in the league must band together to decide crucial
common policy such as the format or method for scheduling
matches to determine the champion, the vertical relationships of
the league to other leagues (i.e., professional to amateur), the
horizontal relationships of the league to other leagues (i.e., professional to professional), the conditions of entry and exit (i.e.,
membership, the geographic distribution thereof, and whether
its member are subject to relegation and promotion), the methods for deciding and enforcing league rules and policies (e.g., arbitrability), as well as many other joint economic decisions.120
The teams must coordinate to produce competitive balance, a degree of uncertainty of outcome in the game, lest all viewers lose
interest because the league becomes predictable.121 Teams also

118. Stefan Késenne, The Optimal Competitive Balance in a Sports League?,
in THE ECONOMICS OF COMPETITIVE SPORTS 85 (Rodríguez et al. eds., 2015).
119. See Salil K. Mehra & T. Joel Zuercher, Striking Out “Competitive Balance” in Sports, Antitrust, and Intellectual Property, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
1499, 1527–28 (2006).
120. Roger G. Noll, The Organization of Sports Leagues, 19 OXFORD REV.
ECON. POL’Y 530, 531 (2003).
121. Id.
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pool their rights to offer, jointly, products such as pooled broadcasting rights or player apparel.122 The league quasi-integrates
the individual teams to increase efficiency in organized play,
save on transaction costs, and offer better products on the market.
Sports leagues operate in multi-sided markets wherein the
teams compete for consumers (fans, viewers, purchasers of merchandise) and for players. Two-sided markets are situations in
which a “platform . . . facilitate[s] interactions between different
end-users. The owner of this platform will usually try to court
both sides of the market at prices that allow a profit.”123 However, two-sided markets are often faced with a perverse incentive
to restrain one side of the market to benefit the other side of the
market,124 which may trigger antitrust scrutiny.
2. Traditional Sports Antitrust Concerns
Antitrust law, also known as competition law, is deeply concerned with cooperation among competitors. After providing a
brief primer on antitrust law surrounding joint ventures, this
Section outlines several anticompetitive practices that adversely
affect the market for traditional sports. Because traditional
sports economics serves as the base for esports economics,125
there is a heightened possibility of mirrored attempts by esports
league operators to control the esports market in the same manner.
It has been argued that the sports leagues in the United
States have formed monopolies (or monopsonies126) despite the
country’s capacity to support more than one league playing at
the highest level.127 The Big Four—the National Football
122. See infra notes 260–67 and accompanying text.
123. Mehra & Zuercher, supra note 119, at 1528.
124. Id. at 1528–29.
125. See generally Chao, supra note 8 (discussing how esports mirror traditional sports); Holden et al., supra note 1 (describing the legal consequences of
the classification of esports as a “sport”).
126. A monopsony is a market structure in which a single buyer substantially controls the market of many sellers. The NFL could be considered a monopsonist of professional football players, while also being a monopolist over
professional football games. See Xiao Gang Che & Brad Humphreys, Rival
Sports League Formation and Competition, in THE ECONOMICS OF COMPETITIVE
SPORTS 11 (Rodríguez et al. eds., 2015).
127. Id. at 7; Noll, supra note 120, at 550 (“All nations allow the top leagues
to be monopolies . . . .”).
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League, National Basketball Association, National Hockey
League, and Major League Baseball—have all faced rival
leagues and dealt with them through absorption (e.g., NFL’s
merger with the All-America Football Conference in 1949) or economic competition (e.g., paying player salaries that are unsustainable in lesser leagues).128 In fact, these sports leagues have
even received special treatment either through the courts129 or
by convincing Congress on antitrust matters.130
Antitrust law deals with promoting fair competition for the
benefit of consumers. The primary tool for protecting competition is the Sherman Act. Section 1 of the Sherman Act131 prohibits unreasonable restraints of trade;132 Section 2 of the Sherman
Act prohibits monopolization or attempts thereof.133 Both sections target two or more entities acting to the detriment of a
third party; this is known as concerted action.134 Concerted action135 cases must show (1) the existence of a contract, combination, or conspiracy among two or more separate entities136 that

128. NEIL LONGLEY, AN ABSENCE OF COMPETITION: THE SUSTAINED
PETITIVE ADVANTAGE OF THE MONOPOLY SPORTS LEAGUES 1–2 (2013).

COM-

129. Fed. Baseball Club v. Nat’l League, 259 U.S. 200, 208 (1922) (finding
MLB exempt from antitrust law due to its local nature); see also Flood v. Kuhn,
407 U.S. 258, 285 (1972) (maintaining the established aberration); Toolson v.
N.Y. Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356, 357 (1953) (upholding MLB antitrust exception).
130. E.g., Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961, 15 U.S.C. § 1291 (2012) (exempting professional team sports from the antitrust laws).
131. 15 U.S.C. § 1.
132. Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 31 (1911).
133. 15 U.S.C. § 2.
134. See Copperweld Corp. v. Indep. Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 768 (1984)
(denying applicability of Section 1 in concerted action cases where the entities
are, in reality, a single entity and therefore only subject to Section 2). While
American Needle, Inc. v. NFL determined that sports leagues are effectively cartels not falling within the single entity exception, it is unclear whether the case’s
holding is controlling in the esports context. 560 U.S. 183, 202 (2010). Put otherwise, will the joint venture between the game publisher and the league be
considered a single entity or concerted action?
135. Concerted action cases are different from independent action cases. Section 1 of the Sherman Act only applies to concerted action while Section 2 applies to both, but only if the action “monopolizes” or “threatens actual monopolization.” Am. Needle, 560 U.S. at 191.
136. The Court has recently confirmed that a sports league, for purposes of
the sale of licensing rights to third parties, does not fall within the single entity
exception to antitrust laws. Id. at 204. Given the analogous structure of some
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(2) unreasonably restrains trade, and (3) affects interstate or foreign commerce.137 Section 1 is important to the esports analysis
because the court may fail to find monopolization by any one
publisher in violation of Section 2 but recognize that the practice
is unreasonable in violation of Section 1.138
In addition to concerted action, Section 2, prohibiting monopoly, applies to independent action—when a single firm
abuses its dominant status, known as market power, to the detriment of competitors.139 To be clear, the law does not punish a
successful competitor but only one who quells competition. Monopolization, threatened monopolization, or conspiracy to monopolize can be achieved through different types of prohibited
conducted.140 Despite being a more difficult claim, Section 2 is
important in the esports context because it is unclear whether
the judicial system would consider licensing deals as pooled licensing or the independent action of the publisher, which would
not be subject to Section 1.141
In either case, the courts must first define the market before
addressing the negative effects of alleged anticompetitive conduct. Definition of a market142 is necessary because determining
esports leagues, American Needle likely controls, though such a discussion is
outside the scope of this Note.
137. See, e.g., Orr v. Bank of Am., 285 F.3d 764, 782 (9th Cir. 2002).
138. This may occur in the event that the court defines the market as esports
rather than the individual titles. See Miroff, supra note 8, at 204–05.
139. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).
140. For instance, exclusive dealing is when a retailer agrees to purchase
from a supplier and promises to purchase from no other supplier. E.g., Am. Needle, 560 U.S. at 187. Refusal to supply an essential facility is when a company
bottlenecks a market to deny entry by competitors by controlling an “essential
facility.” In the sports league context, the American Pro Football League tried
to characterize the Washington Redskins’ NFL stadium as an essential facility
for the exhibition of professional football games, but the court disagreed and
found that the Redskins’ refusal to share the stadium did not violate antitrust
law. Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 570 F.2d 982, 985–86 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
141. While the single entity exception to Section 1 liability is implicated due
to the unique role of the game publisher in control of the leagues, determining
the applicability of said exception is well beyond the scope of this Note.
142. This has been defined as “the area of effective competition.” Ohio v. Am.
Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2285 (2018) (quoting Walker Process Equip., Inc.
v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 177 (1965)). It is typically “the
arena within which significant substitution in consumption or production occurs.” Id. (quoting HERBERT HOVENKAMP & PHILLIP E. AREEDA, FUNDAMENTALS OF ANTITRUST LAW § 15.02[B] (4th ed. 2017)).
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whether the restraints “lessen or destroy competition” is effectively a question of market power—the ability to raise price profitability by restricting output.143 Markets can be spliced based
off of distinctions in kind and distinctions of degree.144 For instance, courts have repeatedly held that individual sports constitute separate markets and, within those markets, the collegiate may be considered separate from the professional or even
pre-professional markets.145 Consumer demand effectively determines if two markets are actually one based on fungibility and
substitution.
The challenged conduct in the defined market may be illegal
per se or unreasonable under a rule of reason analysis. Price fixing146 and geographic market allocation147 are examples of concerted conduct illegal per se because the act “would always or
almost always tend to restrict competition and decrease output.”148 However, when the practice falls outside of judicially
enumerated categories of per se conduct, or where “restraints on
competition are essential if the product is to be available at all,”
the restraint should be viewed under the rule of reason.149 Under
this analysis, the court conducts a balancing test weighing the
practice’s (1) unreasonableness and competitive harm (2) against
its pro-competitive justifications (3) in light of less harmful alternatives to achieving the pro-competitive justification. Given
the need to cooperate in a sports league, this framework merits
significant attention.
143. Id. (quoting Walker Process Equip., 382 U.S. at 177).
144. Id.
145. E.g., NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 112
(1984) (separating college football from professional football); Int’l Boxing Club
of N.Y., Inc. v. United States, 358 U.S. 242, 252 (1959) (finding championship
boxing separate from boxing contests generally).
146. Price fixing is when two or more entities agree to set the price for a
product jointly instead of competing for consumers. E.g., United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 397–98 (1927).
147. Geographic market allocation would occur when two or more entities
agree not to compete within particular territories.
148. Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 19–20
(1979) (quoting United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 436 n.13
(1978)). Other examples include group boycotts—joint refusals not to deal with
a particular vendor or purchaser—and tying arrangements—an agreement to
sell a product or service conditioned upon a different, tied, product or the promise not to purchase that tied product from competitors. N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United
States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
149. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. at 101.
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To begin, the plaintiff must show that the restraint on trade
is unreasonable150 and would harm competition, taking into account the business, the condition before and after the restraint
was imposed, and the restraint’s history, nature, and effect.151
Then, the defendant may counter the unreasonableness by
providing a procompetitive justification that outweighs the anticompetitive effects. The procompetitive justification in the sports
context is competitive balance:
Competitive balance means in essence that all of the league’s teams are
of sufficiently comparable strength that . . . fans will be in enough
doubt about the probable outcome of each game and of the various division races that they will be interested in watching the games, thus
supporting the teams’. . . revenues.152

Upon showing of a procompetitive justification, the plaintiff
can, theoretically, question the legitimacy of the justification by
showing less harmful alternatives to achieving the same goals.
However, most cases and the hearings before Congress focus on
two elements: either the restraint is not unreasonable or competitive balance outweighs the harms.
In the application of both the per se and rule of reason tests,
history, from about the 1950s onwards, has defined several anticompetitive practices in sports, including “awarding territorial
protection; creating the reserve clause and player draft; setting
minimum prices; giving the commissioner power to unilaterally
issue edicts; and, later, pursuing national television contracts.”153 Other antitrust issues stemmed from the major
leagues’ treatment of players and hoarding of talent in the minor

150. Unreasonableness has been a matter of judicial policy either favoring
consumer protection or market protection. Compare ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 405–07 (1978) (arguing for consumer protection), with Khan,
supra note 7, at 737–39 (criticizing pure consumer protection tests).
151. State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997). For a sports example, the
Supreme Court found that the National Collegiate Athletics Association violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act when it restricted television of games to
encourage live attendance because it reduced supply. Bd. of Regents of the Univ.
of Okla., 468 U.S. at 88.
152. Smith v. Pro-Football, 420 F. Supp. 738, 745 (D.D.C. 1976), aff’d in part,
rev’d in part, 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
153. DAVID GEORGE SURDAM, THE BIG LEAGUES GO TO WASHINGTON: CONGRESS AND SPORTS ANTITRUST, 1951–1989, at 30 (2015).
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leagues.154 (Esports have, at the very least, adopted the territorial divisions,155 player rights issues,156 and pooled international
broadcasting practices.157) At that time, the leagues used two
primary defenses: (1) the body before which the league is appearing is not the appropriate authority to rule on the practice158 and
(2) the restraints on trade are justifiable under competitive balance. Teams and leagues used these arguments to obtain antitrust exemptions to allow for current practices and to rebuff Congress’s attempts to disrupt the industry’s trend of selfregulation.159
3. Critiquing Competitive Balance and the Competing
Competitions Alternative
Sports antitrust academics continue to seek alternatives to
the current economic practices; the crux of the competing competitions theory is the idea that more than a singular championship can take place so as to introduce rivals into the industry
thereby incentivizing an efficient market through competition.160 American sports leagues—perhaps unnecessarily—all
result in a single championship competition. Competitive balance assumes that consumers would not be interested in having
multiple first-place teams, particularly if they never played each
154. Id. at 32–33, 48, 56 (discussing the effects of the reserve clause on salary negotiations, the farm systems whereby a single team may control hundreds
of minor league players, and the culture of keeping salaries secret); see also
Study of Monopoly Power: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Study of Monopoly
Power of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, Part 6, Organized Baseball, 82d Cong.
2 (1952) (statement of Rep. Emanuel Celler, Chairman, H. Comm. on the Judiciary); Peskin, supra note 39 (discussing antitrust issues regarding salary caps).
155. It should be noted that only the Overwatch League has steadfastly held
onto the city-based team branding methodology. Dota 2 teams are only affiliated
by organizations and split into regions. League of Legends teams are affiliated
by organization and by region (e.g. North America, Korea, Europe, etc.). See
Philip Kollar, Overwatch League Is Blizzard’s Ambitious New Esports Org, Includes City-Based Teams, POLYGON (Nov. 4, 2016), https://www.polygon.com/
2016/11/4/13511762/overwatch-league-is-blizzards-ambitious-new-esports
-org-includes-city [https://perma.cc/NB9N-3NDV].
156. Heggem, supra note 2.
157. Introduction to the Esports Ecosystem, ESPORTS OBSERVER, https://
esportsobserver.com/the-esports-eco-system [https://perma.cc/C25R-8SVG].
158. SURDAM, supra note 153, at 47.
159. The exact arguments will be considered in turn in Part III so as to determine their applicability in the esports context.
160. Mehra & Zuercher, supra note 119, at 1515.

1612

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[104:1585

other to determine the ultimate champion. However, the English
Premier League represents a successful league whose teams
sometimes compete in more than one championship.161 Teams
are not restricted from competing in multiple tournaments.162
The promotion and relegation system also allows new meritorious teams to enter the market if they successfully work their way
up through the divisional system.163 Fan interest remains high
despite the practices deemed necessary for the maintenance of
competitive balance.164
Competing competitions, despite some drawbacks, incentivize two levels of competition: intraleague and interleague. On
the one hand, teams compete intraleague to stay within the highest echelon of professional play. This “open architecture” means
that teams must consistently invest in their players to ensure
competitive success.165 However, the open architecture also
means that teams are more risky investments for sponsors in the
event of relegation or poor performance. On the other hand, the
league competes with other leagues for concurrent viewership
and for team participation. Together, competing competitions
represents an alternative conceptualization of sports leagues
that incentivizes competition by decoupling leagues and tournaments from teams. It has not been addressed by Congress or the
courts as a viable alternative or weakening of the competitive
balance argument, but esports has begun to experiment with
this economic structure.
D. ESPORTS: STAKEHOLDERS, ECONOMICS, AND THE PUBLISHERCONTROLLED LEAGUE
Having now discussed the two broad analogous industries of
sports and entertainment, as well as the copyright and antitrust
laws underlying each, it is necessary to focus on esports itself.
First, this Section discusses the various stakeholders in esports
161.
162.
163.
164.

Id. at 1522.
Id.
Id. at 1523.
See generally ERNST & YOUNG LLP, PREMIER LEAGUE: ECONOMIC AND
SOCIAL IMPACT 4, 17 (2019), https://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/EY
-Premier-League-economic-and-social-impact-January-2019/$FILE/EY
-Premier-League-economic-and-social-impact-January-2019.pdf [https://perma
.cc/3VZ6-WBG8] (discussing growth of the Premier League and its role in fostering soccer, even in other leagues).
165. Mehra & Zuercher, supra note 119, at 1524.
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and their role within the industry. Next, it breaks down the different distinctions in the industry, namely by game type or genre
(differences in kind) and by level of professionalism (differences
in degree). Finally, this Section narrows the focus to publishercontrolled leagues as a particularly problematic phenomenon
triggering antitrust concerns.
1. Esports Stakeholders
In addition to the league, esports have stabilized to include
four classes of stakeholders: players, organizations (teams),166
channelers, and tournament operators (including the publisher).167 Each category of stakeholders will be discussed in
turn.
The first stakeholder is the player. Consider the typical scenario: a person plays a video game such as League of Legends to
the point that he168 is no longer satisfied with casual play and
commits a significant amount of time to improving his mechanical skills.169 He may choose to climb through the built-in online
leaderboard system of the game (e.g., the ranked queue170 for

166. Throughout this Note, the term “organization” is used as opposed to
“team” because the corporate entity invests in more than just professional players for a single league in a single esports title. An organization may boast a
competitive roster in several esports titles and multiple signed streamers.
167. Chao, supra note 8, at 744 (listing game publishers, tournament organizers, teams, players, sponsors, and streaming sites as industry stakeholders);
An Introduction to the Esports Ecosystem, supra note 16 (describing the entities
involved in the esports industry); see also Miroff, supra note 8, at 187–89 (listing
publishers, organizers, broadcasters, teams, professional players, viewers, and
advertisers as entities).
168. While women compete and play video games professionally, the industry is dominated by men. See generally TAYLOR, supra note 19, at 118–28, for a
discussion of women in gaming and a criticism of the mythos of the lack of
women in gaming. This Note will use the pronoun “he” to refer to gamers.
169. See generally Graham Ashton, What Is the Optimum Training Time for
Esports Players?, ESPORTS OBSERVER (Dec. 28, 2017), https://esportsobserver
.com/optimum-player-training-time [https://perma.cc/Q3BY-US8E] (finding
play and practice times of over fifteen hours a day).
170. A ranked queue refers to the matchmaking system that pits the player
against those of similar caliber based on criteria within the game. The player
has the ability to “climb the ladder” by consistently winning and showing that
he is of a better caliber. The system is ranked in so much as there are different
tiers and eventually a leaderboard for the best of the best.
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League of Legends171 or Dota 2), search for competitive teammates online, or enter amateur tournaments. Like other esports
athletes, he is competing against all other players for recognition
by a professional organization.172 The reality is that the pool of
professional video game players is incredibly shallow relative to
the number of players generally.173 In the interim, or in the event
of failure, he may opt to try his hand at personal streaming174 or
play at the collegiate level.175

171. In fact, such ranked play is required for League of Legends. N. AM.
LEAGUE OF LEGENDS CHAMPIONSHIP SERIES, 2018 OFFICIAL RULES NA LCS
AND NA LACS § 2.4 (2018) [hereinafter 2018 NA LCS RULES], https://esports
-assets.s3.amazonaws.com/production/files/rules/2018_LCS_LACS_Rules.pdf
[https://perma.cc/X2LW-4UX9].
172. See Michael Arin, Esports & Employment After Dynamex, ESPORTS B.
ASS’N J. (Oct. 10, 2019), https://esportsbar.org/journals/2019/10/esports-and
-employment-after-dynamex [https://perma.cc/C776-DK2M], for an in-depth
look at the life of the player and his relationship to the organization.
173. For example, League of Legends boasts a monthly user-base of over 100
million players worldwide. Paul Tassi, Riot Games Reveals ‘League of Legends’
Has 100 Million Monthly Players, FORBES (Sept. 13, 2016), https://www
.forbes.com/sites/insertcoin/2016/09/13/riot-games-reveals-league-of-legends
-has-100-million-monthly-players/#3dde46fe5aa8 [https://perma.cc/45JX
-3VKG]. Even using a conservative estimate of players that engage in competitive ranked play, this number still hovers over 1.6 million in North America
alone. DrCyanide, League’s Decline – By the Numbers, LEAGUE OF LEGENDS:
BOARDS (Sept. 9, 2018), https://boards.na.leagueoflegends.com/en/c/general
-discussion/ka7IqcPM-leagues-decline-by-the-numbers [https://perma.cc/JD32HR2U]. In comparison, the League of Legends Championship Series (LCS) consists of ten teams of five players for a total of fifty possible starting positions in
the United States. Even including other leagues, back-up players, academy-tier
teams, and staff (analysts, coaches, etc.), the couple hundred possible positions
are insignificant when compared to the number of players generally.
174. Compare Joshua Calixto, Meet Michael ‘Imaqtpie’ Santana, the World’s
Best ‘League of Legends’ Streamer, ROLLINGSTONE (Mar. 23, 2017), https://web
.archive.org/web/20180617153433/http://www.rollingstone.com/glixel/news/
meet-imaqtpie-the-worlds-best-league-streamer-w473364 [https://perma.cc/
K6UN-88SQ] (former professional turned online personality), with Zachary
Scuderi, Sneaky Shares How He Became a Pro League of Legends Player,
IBUYPOWER: BLOG (Aug. 6, 2013), http://blog.ibuypower.com/blog/2013/08/06/
sneaky-shares-how-he-became-a-pro-league-of-legends-player/ [https://perma
.cc/E3G6-W5HY] (current professional player for Cloud9).
175. Michael Arin, Matchmaking Mishaps: NCAA Amateurism and Collegiate Esports, MINN. L. REV.: DE NOVO BLOG (Oct. 31, 2018), https://
minnesotalawreview.org/2018/10/31/matchmaking-mishaps-ncaa-amateurism
-and-collegiate-esports-2/#_edn1 [https://perma.cc/9S6R-CVU5];
John T. Holden et al., A Short Treatise on Esports and the Law: How America
Regulates Its Next National Pastime, 2020 U. Ill. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2020)
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Meanwhile, organizations are akin to teams in the traditional sports leagues; they compete in the league, for players,
and for fandom. For instance, “LoL esports represents professional League of Legends on a global scale. . . . Each 10-team
league competes over nine weeks, with every team facing one
another twice per split, for a total of 18 games each.”176 The product is the competitive league, akin to traditional sports franchises.177 The league imposes internal rules on the organizations
such as minimum player salary,178 scheduling, dispute resolution via the league commissioner,179 territory allocation,180 and
player eligibility requirements (e.g., must be eighteen or older to
play), including regional residency requirements (e.g., citizenship).181 While the leagues often publish some rules publicly, 182
others such as the league operating agreement are kept secret.
(manuscript at 62–69) (discussing issues related to collegiate esports); see infra
notes 202–07 and accompanying text.
176. About LoL Esports, RIOT GAMES, https://eu.lolesports.com/en/about/
about-lol-esports [https://perma.cc/QKA4-QKM2]. Since the rebranding and
separation of the North American (LCS) and European leagues (League of Legends European Championship Series (LEC)), the format and number of teams
stayed the same, but each league now has a distinct identity. Jack Stewart, Riot
Rebrands NA LCS Following the Creation of the LEC, ESPORTS OBSERVER (Dec.
14, 2018), https://esportsobserver.com/riot-rebrands-na-lcs/ [https://perma.cc/
93VS-5VS9]; see Riot Games: Creating a New Era for Esports, DESIGNSTUDIO,
https://design.studio/work/lec [https://perma.cc/RGQ7-2VYS] (describing the
LEC rebrand).
177. See, e.g., Imad Khan, Riot Releases Details on NA LCS Franchising with
$10M Flat-Fee Buy-in, ESPN (June 1, 2017), https://www.espn.com/esports/
story/_/id/19511222/riot-releases-details-na-lcs-franchising-10m-flat-fee-buy-in
[https://perma.cc/QR95-6P7E].
178. See generally Bayliss, supra note 2, at 372 (questioning whether the
mandatory minimum salaries, among other league rules, make the league an
employer of the players).
179. E.g., Chris Greeley, Quick Notes: How We Make the Match Schedule,
LEAGUE OF LEGENDS (May 1, 2018), https://nexus.leagueoflegends.com/en-us/
2018/05/quick-notes-how-we-make-the-match-schedule/ [https://perma.cc/
R57K-ERWJ] (explaining NA LCS Commissioner Greeley’s attempt at providing competitive balance through scheduling).
180. E.g., Susie Kim (@lilsusie), TWITTER (Aug. 3, 2018, 11:28 PM), https://
twitter.com/lilsusie/status/1025599453636395008 [https://perma.cc/6Q67
-KXEA] (lamenting the inability to do a fan meet-and-greet event in Seoul as
general manager of the London Spitfire because “there are [Overwatch] region
regulations and . . . Dynasty had said that they did not want to give us permission in their region”).
181. See, e.g., 2018 NA LCS RULES, supra note 171, §§ 2.1–6.
182. E.g., id.
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Nevertheless, public information, leaked information, and social
media posts by players and organization owners reveal a structure that mimics a traditional sports league.183 Organizations ultimately serve as a middleman between the player and the
league or tournament operators.
Channelers invest in the esports industry or aid in the distribution of the product to a greater audience. Channelers include streaming platforms such as Twitch, YouTube, and even
Valve that compete to provide the best interactive viewing experience184 and sponsors who provide financial support to players,
organizations, leagues, streaming platforms, and tournament
organizers.185 While channelers are not direct content producers
like the other industry stakeholders, esports would collapse
without the added value of distribution and financial investment.
Finally, tournament operators facilitate the relationship between teams and players and teams and channelers. Tournaments may either be independent or publisher-controlled. Organizers such as ESL, DreamHack, and Major League Gaming
that compete for the in-person attendance and online viewership
license the game from the publisher.186 In comparison, publisher-controlled leagues—such as Riot Games for League of Legends Championship Series, Activision Blizzard for Overwatch
League, and Valve for Dota 2 Pro Circuit—benefit from the close
relationship with the publisher; publishers have no incentive to
withhold rights to the leagues they control.
Esports have greatly veered away from the traditional monetization process of video game rights. Instead of relying on game
sales, many titles are free to play (e.g., Dota 2 and League of Legends) through an end user license agreement and subject to the
terms of use; even games with an initial purchase cost generate
183. See Burk, supra note 103, at 1540–41.
184. Erik Kain, Valve Launched Steam.tv, a New Twitch Competitor, by Mistake, FORBES (Aug. 18, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/erikkain/2018/08/
18/valve-launched-twitch-competitor-steam-tv-early-by-mistake/
#6be5f1243a53 [https://perma.cc/U4US-CPPT].
185. Ben Fischer, Esports’ Next Big Mission: Win Over Sponsors, SPORTS
BUS. J. (May 28, 2018), https://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/Journal/Issues/
2018/05/28/In-Depth/Esports.aspx [https://perma.cc/77ZY-GP2T]; An Introduction to the Esports Ecosystem, supra note 16; Peskin, supra note 39. Sponsors
sponsor players, teams, or tournaments.
186. An Introduction to the Esports Ecosystem, supra note 16.
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more revenue through microtransactions of cosmetic items.187
Secondly, users are no longer simply consuming (i.e., playing)
the game, but instead they are live streaming competitive play
largely supported through online advertising to consumers
watching online.188 Detached from physical games and in-person
audiences, tournaments and esports as a whole depend on monetization of intellectual property rights. In the end, who controls
these rights—players, organizations, channelers, independent
tournament organizers, or the publisher—is of immense importance.
2. Esports Potential Market Considerations
Having described the playing field of stakeholders, it is also
important to outline different potential markets.189 The question
of “what is the market” is both pivotal to antitrust law and incredibly elusive in the esports context.190 As mentioned in the
sports context, the market is defined based on demand substitution.191 Consumer demand often falls into particularly identifiable categories based on divisions in kind and divisions in degree.
In the esports industry, distinctions in kind revolve around
the type of video games, or, on a particularized scale, individual
games.192 The first type of distinction is based on genre. Major
esports titles can be categorized into Multiplayer Online Battle
Arenas (MOBAs) (e.g., League of Legends and Dota 2),193 First-

187. Darren Heitner, A Look Inside Riot Games, from $320,000 Player Salaries to Using Esports as a Catalyst for Sales, FORBES (May 2, 2018),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/darrenheitner/2018/05/02/a-look-inside-riot
-games-from-320000-player-salaries-to-using-esports-as-a-catalyst-for-sales/
#60596ab2c6a7 [https://perma.cc/JM6E-3JVN].
188. Fischer, supra note 185.
189. The purpose of this Note is not to present a critical analysis of the market. See Miroff, supra note 8, for an answer to that question. However, recognizing the distinctions is important for understanding the encompassing nature
of the term “esports.”
190. Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2285 (2018); Fischer, supra
note 185. The focus of this Note is not an analysis of the proper market for antitrust purposes. Nevertheless, a description of the market subdivisions is necessary to understand exactly why intellectual property law is in tension with
antitrust law—at least in the esports context.
191. See supra Part I.C.
192. Miroff, supra note 8, at 199–204.
193. MOBAs involve two teams controlling characters in a battle to destroy
the other team’s base.
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Person Shooters (FPSs) (e.g., Overwatch, Counter Strike: Global
Offensive, Call of Duty, and Halo),194 Battle Royale (e.g., Fortnite
and PUBG),195 and fighting games (e.g., Dragon Ball Z, Super
Smash Bros., and Street Fighter).196 However, games, despite being in the same genre, are generally not fungible.197 Despite similarities across games, professional players do not compete in
multiple titles, and spectatorship trends suggest that people are
attracted only to a single game.198 However, esports as a whole
tends to attract viewers from one identifiable demographic regardless of genre or title,199 therefore having the same value to
advertisers (for whom tournaments compete).200 Distinctions in
kind suggest two possible market definitions, consistent with
Miroff’s analysis: individual esports titles or esports generally.201
Distinctions in degree also suggest a vertical hierarchy in
the esports industry: collegiate,202 amateur, and professional.203

194. FPSs can be both team and single-player events where the player plays
from the perspective of a character with a gun. The objectives of the game vary
from objective control to simply killing other players.
195. The newest form of competitive play, Battle Royales, take the FPS game
type and expand the number of competitors, pitting the player or team against
hundreds of others in a king-of-the-hill, last-man-standing experience.
196. Fighting games are single or duo events where players control characters and fight the other players in a match of survival.
197. Saying that League of Legends and Dota 2 are fungible because they are
both MOBAs would be like saying football and soccer are interchangeable because they both have a ball.
198. Maddy Myers, Survey: 42 Percent of Esports Viewers Don’t Play the
Games They Watch, KOTAKU: COMPETE (May 12, 2017), https://compete.kotaku
.com/survey-42-percent-of-esports-viewers-dont-play-the-gam-1795163095
[https://perma.cc/KZN3-JE6X] (finding that 70% of viewers only watch a single
esports title).
199. CHASE BUCKLE & JASON MANDER, GLOBALWEBINDEX, ESPORTS
TRENDS REPORT 2018, at 3–4 (2018), https://cdn2.hubspot.net/hubfs/304927/
Downloads/Esports-report.pdf?t=1528372092399 [https://perma.cc/SWB7
-UJM2] (defining the average viewer as a young, affluent man).
200. Cf. Int’l Boxing Club of N.Y., Inc. v. United States, 358 U.S. 242, 250–
52 (1959) (discussing the different markets for promotion of nonchampionship
and championship boxing based on valuation of broadcasting rights).
201. Miroff, supra note 8, at 199–205.
202. Cf. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1293 (2012) (providing limited antitrust exceptions to professional football, baseball, basketball, and hockey telecasts so long
as they do not compete with intercollegiate athletics).
203. As mentioned previously, esports mimic sports in even artificial means.
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Unlike the collegiate scene in traditional sports, there does not
appear to be a unique demand for collegiate esports.204 Furthermore, the collegiate esports market is not a gateway for professional play like in traditional sports.205 Instead, the professional
league is generally prohibited from interfering with collegiate
play.206 In its place, some leagues foster an amateur market that
serves as a talent scouting ground for future professional players.207 Organizations may be required to maintain both professional and amateur teams.208 Yet neither the collegiate nor the
amateur market has been effectively capitalized by producing a
distinguishable audience from the professional scene.209 In the
end, the professional scene remains preeminent, and the collegiate and amateurs scenes, at the very least, should not be considered substitutable products.
Despite its relative youth, the esports industry is rich, complex, and largely modeled after traditional sports. The primary
stakeholders combine forces to provide a unified product: a competitive league for a particular esports title. The economics have
shifted from game sales to primarily sponsorships and advertising revenue. But esports have begun to diverge from traditional
sports by foregoing the college-to-pro pipeline and blending the
distinctions in degree of play. Most importantly, the esports
leagues already grapple with complex intellectual property issues in the sale of these rights so central to the industry.

Despite a lack of demand for collegiate esports broadcasts, many publishers assist the college scene due to a large player market.
204. See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 111
(1984) (describing the “uniquely attractive” audience of NCAA football games);
Noll, supra note 120, at 534 (highlighting distinct markets of collegiate and professional sports).
205. Mitch Reames, The Role of College Programs in Pro Esports, SPORTTECHIE (May 7, 2018), https://www.sporttechie.com/role-of-college-esports-ncaa
-league-of-legends-overwatch [https://perma.cc/HK26-RYKR].
206. See, e.g., 2018 NA LCS RULES, supra note 171, § 5.5 (restricting recruitment of players already committed to collegiate League of Legends on scholarship).
207. See generally id. § 1 (referencing the North American League of Legends Academy Championship Series).
208. See id.; see also infra Part II.B.2.a (discussing farm system).
209. Contra Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. at 111 (distinguishing collegiate athletics from professional telecasts based on “an audience
uniquely attractive to advertisers”).
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3. The Rise of Publisher-Controlled Leagues
The most successful esports title is League of Legends, created by Riot Games; an up-and-coming title is Overwatch by
Blizzard Entertainment. The competitive scenes for both games,
at the highest echelon, have significant involvement from entities related to the game publishers.210 While some authors prefer
the term “developer-sponsored leagues,”211 this Note uses the
term “publisher-controlled leagues” to refer to joint ventures between teams with significant involvement and rule-setting by
the rights holders. The difference can be explained by the change
in intent of the publisher; today, publishers intend to capitalize
on esports as opposed to remaining pure game producers.212
Publisher-controlled leagues are successful, in part, due to
vertical integration efficiencies. Publisher-controlled leagues
wholly consolidate the industry into one efficient league. For instance, Riot Games, through the League of Legends Championship Series (LCS) creates a product: competitive playing of
League of Legends. Riot Games, through a franchise system,
brings ten organizations under its umbrella. Riot Games also
employs broadcast talent and a professional studio crew to create
online streaming content. Using its insider knowledge, Riot
Games’s development team keeps the broadcast talent fully informed of any game changes. Additionally, Riot Games negotiates partnerships with outside sponsors on behalf of the league.
Internationally, Riot Games advertises its league through the
game client directly to players. What is left to be seen is what
Riot Games would do if another tournament challenged its dominant position as the preeminent League of Legends league.

210. It is unclear the exact relation between, for instance, the League of Legends Championship Series and Riot Games, but shared personnel suggest a
close relation if nothing else.
211. See, e.g., Chao, supra note 8, at 745.
212. Compare id. (“‘[Game developers] still see themselves first and foremost
as a game producer—not sports provider.’” (quoting TAYLOR, supra note 45, at
166)), with Webster, supra note 18 (describing publisher’s acquisition of gaming
group “to create the ESPN of e-sports”).
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II. PUBLISHER-CONTROLLED LEAGUES: SPORTS &
ENTERTAINMENT & ANTITRUST ISSUES
This Note argues three interrelated ideas. First, esports is a
combination of both sports and entertainment industries. In considering competition in esports, both sports and entertainment
jurisprudence should be considered. Second, the crux of this Note
is that approaching publisher-controlled leagues from both
sports and entertainment perspectives paints the holistic and
problematic potential for anticompetitive manipulation of intellectual property by publisher-controlled leagues. The publisher
can manipulate its deep copyright control to eliminate or weaken
leagues competing with its favored league. Finally, neither the
esports industry nor the courts will solve this problem. Like traditional sports, esports will push back with the idea of self-regulation. Like entertainment, courts will struggle to understand
the tech-centered industry. Combined, publisher-controlled
leagues will reignite tension between copyright and sports antitrust principles, and the industry remains unstable.
A. ESPORTS: SPORTS & ENTERTAINMENT
While the sports or entertainment classification is important in certain contexts, the antitrust context requires a more
holistic approach that recognizes both industries as analogous
and helpful in the analysis. As history has shown, video games
underwent a sportsification.213 As the demand for organized
competitive playing of video games grew, the esports industry
modeled itself after traditional sports. Games went from being
personal to an opportunity for spectatorship, professionalism,
and organized competition.214 However, cabining esports to
sports jurisprudence fails to recognize the importance of the intellectual property rights that form the base of the industry and
the entertainment industry’s rocky past with using licensing
agreements to achieve market leverage.215 Yet, framing esports
as mere entertainment neglects the intentional economic structuring of the industry and the historically identifiable anticompetitive practices.216 In short, the classification of esports as a
213. See supra notes 43–56 and accompanying text.
214. See generally TAYLOR, supra note 45 (discussing the professionalization
of video games); TAYLOR, supra note 19 (discussing the rise in spectatorship).
215. See supra Part I.B.
216. See supra Part I.C.
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sport is not determinative in the antitrust context and should be
eschewed in favor of a more holistic approach, lest the analysis
remain incomplete.
B. PUBLISHER-CONTROLLED LEAGUES: BENEVOLENT
OVERLORDS
Publisher-controlled leagues, through innovative intellectual property licensing and enforcement, can control the market
for their esports titles in violation of antitrust laws unless Congress steps in. Anticompetitive practices damage consumer welfare. This Section discusses how innovative intellectual property
management by publishers can serve to effectuate the same
practices that drew Congress’s attention to traditional sports
leagues’ antitrust violations. Worse, intellectual property law
could insulate the league operator from antitrust scrutiny, particularly with the lack of jurisprudence on copyright and antitrust interplay. After showing why the lack of limitations on copyright licensing allows for such broad control by the publisher,
this Section focuses on the rule of reason analysis of anticompetitive practices identified in traditional sports leagues to highlight the court’s likely struggle to reign in anticompetitive practices.
1. Downstream Control via Copyright
The rights of video games to public performance and derivative works are inherently implicated in the user-generated content produced in the esports industry. Players play the video
game and broadcast their performances through online streaming sites according to the end user license agreement, and subject to any terms of service often automatically assigning back to
the game publisher any derivative copyrights.217 However,
whether this performance constitutes infringement upon the
game publisher’s copyright and the enforceability of the terms of
service remains hotly debated.218

217. E.g., RIOT GAMES, LEAGUE OF LEGENDS TERMS OF USE (NA) § 6.1
(2017), https://na.leagueoflegends.com/en/legal/termsofuse#user-content
[https://perma.cc/73V9-YTBK].
218. Compare Hagen, supra note 96, at 265 (arguing that competitive play
and streaming falls within the fair use exception of copyright law), with Brusa,
supra note 84, at 246 (finding that streaming copyrighted content is an infringing public performance).
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As described in Part I, all arguments in favor of divvying up
the rights over the video game streams face significant challenges. The publishers point to cases like Midway Manufacturing Co. v. Artic International Inc., holding that the publisher’s
copyright extends to every iteration of the video game,219 and
Red Baron-Franklin Park, Inc. v. Taito Corp., determining that
mere play in an arcade—much less than public broadcast
online—constitutes infringing public performance220 to defend
its deep control over the copyrighted material.221 The passage of
time and changing technology may warrant a reconsideration of
the interactivity, fair use, and copyright misuse arguments. The
contribution of players, broadcasters, and the like on top of the
mere playing of the video games continues to grow to such an
extent that, were the video stripped of these contributions, it
would be bereft of any entertainment value. Similarly, the passage of time has led the patent misuse doctrine to become robust
while copyright misuse atrophies, despite increased attentiveness by the Federal Trade Commission to competition and consumer welfare in technology- and copyright-dependent industries dealing with copyright.222
However, under current caselaw, the exclusivity of copyright law allows the game publisher to restrict its product’s esports market, divide it as it pleases, or shut it down entirely at
any time, regardless of any investment made by stakeholders.
While some limits exist, courts are hesitant to blunt the copyright sword and shield. In a rare video game case, Atari Games
Corp. v. Nintendo of America, Inc., the Federal Circuit recognized:

219. 704 F.2d 1009, 1011 (7th Cir. 1983).
220. 883 F.2d 275, 279 (4th Cir. 1989); see also Valve Corp. v. Sierra Entm’t
Inc., 431 F. Supp. 2d 1091, 1098 (W.D. Wash. 2004) (citing Red-Baron favorably
in determining that playing videogames in a cyber-café constitutes a public performance).
221. See generally Harttung, supra note 11 (critiquing this deep control of
downstream markets based on ambiguity of copyright jurisprudence).
222. See supra notes 5–6.
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[W]hen the patented product is so successful that it creates its own economic market or consumes a large section of an existing market, the
aims and objectives of patent and antitrust laws may seem, at first
glance, wholly at odds. . . .
There may on occasion exist, therefore, a fine line between actions
protecting the legitimate interests of a patent owner and antitrust law
violations.223

Equally so, certain markets are entirely dependent upon copyrighted materials, such as the music and video game markets.224
This would be particularly applicable to the esports industry if
the court determines the relevant antitrust market to be an individual game. Hence, Atari’s caution rings true for copyright as
well.
While the Federal Trade Commission has stated that ownership of a copyright does not presumptively confer upon its
owner any market power,225 the Supreme Court has also recognized, albeit in dicta, that certain uses of copyright could run
afoul of antitrust. In Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., the Court relegated the blanket licensing of
copyrighted music to a rule of reason analysis.226 Similar to the
logic used in joint-ventures,227 the Court reasoned that “the line
of commerce . . . being restrained, the performing rights to copyrighted music, exists at all only because of the copyright laws.”228
The blanket licensing of copyrighted music was not per se illegal
because it could have been “reasonably necessary to effectuate
the [copy]rights that are granted. . . .”229 The Court left open the
question of what types of arrangements should be deemed “reasonably necessary.” Nor have the courts adequately considered
copyright antitrust violations under the per se or rule of reason

223. Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 897 F.2d 1572, 1576 (Fed.
Cir. 1990).
224. Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 18–19
(1979).
225. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FTC, ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: PROMOTING INNOVATION AND COMPETITION 2
(2007); see also Mediacom Commc’ns Corp. v. Sinclair Broad. Grp., 460 F. Supp.
2d 1012, 1027–28 (S.D. Iowa) (recognizing the same).
226. Broad. Music, Inc., 441 U.S. at 24.
227. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
228. Broad. Music, Inc., 441 U.S. at 18.
229. Id. at 19.
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analysis outside of pooled rights.230 Without guidance, the industries dependent upon copyright are left to decide the line between legitimate exercises of copyright and antitrust violations.
As a result, tournaments and other downstream participants (e.g., players) unwilling to challenge the status quo
through antitrust suits against the publisher and its leagues
must then license or willingly infringe. Should the publisher
bring suit for infringement, the independent tournament operator may assert that the tournament obtained a valid license from
the players (the independent-interactivity argument, as opposed
to one based on derivative works) and raise the defenses of fair
use and copyright misuse (the “equitable arguments”). However,
to be successful, the independent copyright argument and the
defense of fair use would require overturning of decades-old precedent.231 Therefore, the defendant would be left to stand on the
ill-defined and ill-received defense of copyright misuse.232 While
any one of the arguments or defenses may prove successful, infringers would need to bear the cost of court much like Spotify
bore the initial suits for non-payment of royalties.233 This risk
and the current environment of self-regulation allows the publisher to exert substantial control over the esports market for its
product. Current case law at the intersection of copyright and
antitrust fails to clearly delineate the line between legitimate
rights and violations of antitrust law, only bolstering the idea of
deep control of downstream markets.
2. Copyright Licensing Strategy to Antitrust Concern
Through careful licensing of the publisher’s intellectual
property over the underlying video game, the publisher can suppress competition by playing with the ambiguous limits of its
rights. However, esports is modeled upon sports economics, and
230. See, e.g., United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 144
(1948) (pooled copyrighted movies); Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Am. Soc’y of
Composers, Authors & Publishers, 620 F.2d 930, 934 (2d Cir. 1980), on remand
from Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979), cert.
denied, 450 U.S. 970 (1981) (upholding blanket licensing under rule of reason
analysis after the Court’s ruling that per se analysis was improper); Alden-Rochelle, Inc. v. Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, 80 F. Supp. 888,
894 (S.D.N.Y. 1948) (pooled copyrighted music).
231. See supra Part I.B.
232. See supra Part I.B.2.
233. See supra notes 112–17 and accompanying text.
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traditional sports’ long history with antitrust has established
definite anticompetitive conduct. This Subsection identifies four
anticompetitive practices achievable through copyright licensing
and exclusivity: restricting the supply of players, divvying up
territory to particular teams, pooled broadcasting rights, and
shutting down other competitions. Then, the Subsection will look
at the historical justifications of the anticompetitive—but currently allowed—conduct and determine the applicability to esports. Ultimately, the crossroads creates a paradox of simultaneously legitimate exercises of copyright and illegitimate
antitrust problems.
a. Restricting Supply of Players Through Field of Use
Sports leagues have an incentive to control the pool of possible players. If a competing league cannot obtain the same quality and quantity of talent, the competing league will be uncompetitive and be forced out of the market. Without a competing
league, the standing league is in a better position to negotiate
rights and player salaries.
In the traditional sports context, player rights concerns
drove litigation and provided the most energized offense against
the league’s control over the market. Player rights can be divided
into two issues: vertical integration through the farm system234
and salary restrictions.235 Although both practices found their
strength in the reserve clause—the clause signing away the
player’s rights to play in the league even after the conclusion of
the employment contract,236 vertical integration is possible even
without such a clause. For example, when professional teams in
the MLB (and to a lesser extent the NHL) locked up talent in the
minors, they effectively bottlenecked the flow of players into professional teams. Wealthy teams could buy as many players as

234. SURDAM, supra note 153, at 93.
235. See Peskin, supra note 39.
236. The reserve clause was a common clause in an athlete’s employment
contract that stated that the rights to the player were retained by the team upon
expiration of the contract. This system has been replaced by free agency. Esports titles have already adopted free agency. See, e.g., Jacob Wolf, Six Teams,
Six Moves during League of Legends Free Agency, ESPN (Nov. 14, 2019),
https://www.espn.com/esports/story/_/id/28080255/six-teams-six-moves-league
-legends-free-agency [https://perma.cc/95WY-RDZP] (discussing free agency period for LCS).
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possible thereby preventing other teams from acquiring promising players.237 What was an inter-league problem became a
player problem when the control of reserve clauses forced players to abstain from playing and not be paid for their abstinence.
In addition, the teams could even prevent a competing league
from forming if they controlled enough players.238 Until the
death knell of the reserve clause, the MLB played a game of
keep-away with the issue, consistently shifting which institution
should address the issue.239 Nonetheless, even after the death of
the reserve clause, major leagues continue to exert control over
the minor leagues, justifying such interference on competitive
balance premised on avoiding inter-market encroachment.240
Congress even recognized the validity of this justification by
providing an antitrust exception to pooled broadcast rights in the
Sports Broadcasting Act conditioned upon non-interference with
collegiate athletics.241
Analogously, in the esports context, leagues, such as the
League of Legends Championship Series, require organizations
to field a team of amateur talent—the academy team—in addition to the professional talent.242 Furthermore, the same publisher directly interacts with the collegiate scene.243 Rules are
put in place so that the leagues do not interact or interfere with
each other.244 The game publisher can successfully control three
independent markets—collegiate, amateur, and professional—of
players which feed into each other. Splicing up the levels of play
brings more players under the game publisher’s control and
therefore reduces the opportunities for competing leagues to capture those players and viewers. In addition, Riot operates the
only true professional League of Legends league, thereby forcing

237. SURDAM, supra note 153, at 93.
238. Id. at 94.
239. Id. at 47.
240. Cf. Ryan Mabry, Antitrust Law and the Minor League Reserve System,
6 KALEIDOSCOPE 38, 42–43 (2007) (discussing the Professional Baseball Agreement outlining the intertwined relationship between MLB and the minor
leagues).
241. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1291–1293 (2012).
242. See supra note 173 and accompanying text (discussing amateur players
versus professional teams).
243. See Reames, supra note 205.
244. See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
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players to sign to those teams operating in Riot’s publisher-controlled league in order to play at the highest echelon. This position as a monopsonist—single buyer for multiple sellers—gives
the publisher-controlled league immense bargaining power.
Similar to traditional sports, the publisher can attempt to justify
the market division and control based on a goodwill attempt to
avoid inter-market encroachment.
Additionally, the game publisher controls the supply of players through license revocations, more commonly referred to as
bans. Because every player of the game is playing through an
End User Licensing Agreement subject to the terms of service,245
the player can be stopped from playing the game publisher at
any time, for any (or no) reason. Although revoking this license
is an effective strategy for combatting cheating and other inappropriate online conduct, it could also be used to limit the pool of
players available to play in competing tournaments. And unlike
in traditional sports, the player could not participate in a competing tournament, or even play for personal enjoyment, and the
player’s professional career is gone absent a reversal by the publisher.246
Take, for example, Blizzard’s ban of Chung “Blitzchung” Ng
Wai from the Hearthstone Asia-Pacific Grandmasters. After winning a match that was being streamed, Blitzchung expressed
pro-Hong Kong sentiments.247 Blizzard, likely motivated by its
dependence on the Chinese market that opposed the ongoing revolution in Hong Kong,248 banned the player from the “highest tier
245. See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
246. However, dedicated esports players have evaded these types of bans in
the past, but only with extreme effort. See Eric Van Allen, Riot Games Unbans
Tyler1, A Player it Once Called a ‘Genuine Jerk,’ KOTAKU (Jan. 1, 2018),
https://compete.kotaku.com/riot-games-unbans-tyler1-a-player-it-once-called
-a-ge-1821785186 [https://perma.cc/9A82-CCNN] (claiming that Tyler1 continued to play, subject to an ID ban where, if the account was linked to the player,
it would be banned). But see Matt Perez, Faze Clan Player Permanently Banned
from ‘Fortnite’ for Cheating, FORBES (Nov. 4, 2019), https://www.forbes.com/
sites/mattperez/2019/11/04/faze-clan-player-permanently-banned-from-fortnite-for-cheating [https://perma.cc/9VYJ-PN7U]. Even “successful” players in
this context suffer substantial losses in viewership and therefore revenue. The
unprofitability in the event of a ban becomes absolute if the player depends on
a team salary rather than advertising revenue.
247. Hearthstone Grandmasters Asia-Pacific Ruling, HEARTHSTONE (Oct.
10, 2019), https://playhearthstone.com/en-us/blog/23179289 [https://perma.cc/
FKG4-75XS].
248. Regarding Last Weekend’s Hearthstone Grandmasters Tournament,
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of Hearthstone Esports” for a year and divested him of all earnings for “engaging in any act that, in Blizzard’s sole discretion,
brings [the player] into public disrepute, offends a portion or
group of the public, or otherwise damages Blizzard’s image.”249
While the ban was ultimately reduced to six months and Blizzard did not opt for the nuclear option of a complete ban from the
game, blitzchung could no longer compete at the highest tier of
Hearthstone esports and suffered serious economic consequences.
One may instinctually push back on the threat of player
bans based on the number of players in the video game market.
Millions play the games, but very few people possess the aptitude to be a professional esports players; for this reason, they are
likened to athletes.250 Nevertheless, the extreme costs—particularly social costs—of banning a player, waiting for them to play
during the ban, and then pursuing legal action to stop their now
infringement, do disincentivize this behavior. Even so, the game
publisher can always make an example out of a particular player
in a competing league to shake investment in its competitors.
While a naked ban absent any reason would trigger immediate
scrutiny, the EULA and TOS of the game usually prohibits a
wide range of conduct that serves as a justification for the revocation—even if one is not needed. The revocation would be justified under the publisher’s legitimate exercise of its copyright.
b. Territorial Divisions & Geographic Limitations
Next, both traditional sports leagues and the Overwatch
League have experimented with territorial divisions. Limiting
the number of organizations to one per city and creating local
monopolies is enticing to sports leagues.251 First, consumers associate with a local identity; that identity is tapped into by local
BLIZZARD ENTM’T (Oct. 12, 2019), https://news.blizzard.com/en-us/blizzard/
23185888/regarding-last-weekend-s-hearthstone-grandmasters-tournament
[https://perma.cc/7XLG-N6T2] (“The specific views expressed by blitzchung
were NOT a factor in the decision we made. I want to be clear: our relationships
in China had no influence on our decision.”). People expressed doubt about this
statement. E.g., @Slasher, TWITTER (Oct. 11, 2019, 5:31 PM), https://twitter
.com/Slasher/status/1182815995406225408 [https://perma.cc/B48X-9K8A].
249. Hearthstone Grandmasters Asia-Pacific Ruling, supra note 247.
250. Cf. 2018 NA LCS RULES, supra note 171 (requiring a rank of Diamond
3 or above in ranked solo queue which amounts to less than the top 1% of players
even eligible to join a team).
251. See infra notes 252–57 and accompanying text.
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teams, and hometown pride drives viewership.252 Placing teams
strategically can increase viewership efficiently instead of placing multiple teams in a single locale and only seeing marginal
increases in an already tapped market. MLB, NFL, and now the
popular Overwatch League have seen the results of this method
of branding.253 Second, organizations can begin to develop the
infrastructure for physical on-site events. Being packed in an energized stadium with other enthusiasts, feet from the professional players, is a tried-and-true product in the sports context.
Similar results are shown in the esports context.254
These territorial restrictions provided an easy and noticeable restraint on trade to focus on for Congressional representatives seeking to placate constituent demand for a home team in
the 1950s. At the time, major leagues decided where teams could
be located; they could not move nor enter the territory of another
team. The 1951 Congressional hearings, in particular, pressured
the MLB to expand or relocate towards the Pacific coast.255 The
committee reported that the territorial restrictions ensured
teams did not face competition from one another.256 In 1958, the
NFL defended similar territorial restrictions and the requirement of unanimous consent for a team to move into another
team’s territory under a theory of competitive balance: without
the protection, teams may encroach upon another in the same
city.257 Without competition, the organization in charge of the
event can effectively set supracompetitive ticket prices without
fear.
Exclusive licenses to a particular geographic territory are
common practice in IP licensing deals,258 but the local monopoly
is often challenged by competing products. Consider the local
McDonald’s: its franchising agreement may give it the exclusive
252. Rick Maese, Overwatch League Looks to Future of Esports, as London
Spitfire Makes History, WASH. POST (July 28, 2018), https://www
.washingtonpost.com/news/sports/wp/2018/07/28/overwatch-league-looks-to
-future-of-esports-as-london-spitfire-makes-history/?utm_term=d06ad4ec5b78
[https://perma.cc/BL9C-CCHN].
253. Id.; see also supra notes 145–47 and accompanying text.
254. Maese, supra note 252.
255. SURDAM, supra note 153, at 43.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 91.
258. JOHN PALFREY, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STRATEGY 94 (John Gorham
ed., 2012).
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right to sell Big Macs in your neighborhood, but it still has to
contend with the Burger King across the street because their
Whopper is a competing product. In the esports context, most
consumers only follow a single title (the equivalent of eating either Big Macs or Whoppers, but not both) and therefore the local
monopoly controls the entire set.259 Therefore, without competition, the consumers wishing to partake in on-site events must
pay a premium. In the end, providing exclusive licensing arrangements tied to particular localities creates miniature monopolies for organizations that harm consumer welfare. Not only
is it a recognized division of the publisher’s copyright, but it can
be justified on a theory of preventing intraleague encroachment.
c. Pooled Broadcasting Rights & Public Performance
The most recent antitrust concern of the traditional sports
leagues is also central to esports economics: pooled broadcasting
rights. Pooling the broadcasting rights for sale and limiting supply of the product through a blackout are both clear types of concerted action that reduces competition among the organizations
in the sale of media rights. The NFL adopted an early rule prohibiting transmission of a member’s games to other markets during particular times.260 The court upheld the blackout provision
for telecasts while the team is at an away game (finding it a reasonable restraint to protect weaker teams from intraleague competition) but found the restraints on telecasts otherwise illegal
under a rule of reason analysis.261 Lobbyists rushed to Congress
for further expansion for broadcast rights—namely an antitrust
exception for broadcast rights.262 Born from the lobbyists’ efforts
was the Sports Broadcasting Act.263 The Act exempts contracts
for pooled broadcasting rights for leagues participating in football, baseball, basketball, and hockey so long as the broadcasting
does not interfere with collegiate and interscholastic athletics.264
However, the Sports Broadcasting Act specifically enumerates the exempted sports; esports is naturally not among
259. See supra note 198 and accompanying text.
260. Babette Boliek, Antitrust, Regulation, and the “New” Rules of Sports
Telecasts, 65 HASTINGS L.J. 501, 511 (2014).
261. United States v. NFL, 116 F. Supp. 319, 326–27 (E.D. Pa. 1953).
262. Boliek, supra note 260, at 512.
263. Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961, 15 U.S.C. § 1291 (2012).
264. Id.
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them.265 Furthermore, the Sports Broadcasting Act only deals
with commercially-sponsored telecasts rather than the sale of
the rights to subscription services.266 Nevertheless, esports
leagues have entered into exclusive broadcasting agreements
with particular online streaming platforms, possibly in violation
of antitrust law’s prohibition on concerted action.267 Esports
leagues walk a tight line when exclusively licensing to a particular online media platform.268
The league does not have the same antitrust exception or
competitive justification of protecting weaker teams. Should a
competing streaming service attempt to challenge the grouped
package, the publisher-controlled league will likely argue that
the “grouped package” is in fact the sale of a license of its public
performance rights rather than that of the league. Under Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., the publisher could say that the licensing is “reasonably necessary to
effectuate the [copy]rights that are granted.”269 In the end, the
game publisher who controls the league retains the rights to
public performance and may authorize anyone or no one to create such copies of the video game content.270 Instead of being
characterized as concerted action among the teams and the
league, the “pooling” arrangements may in fact be a sale of public
performance rights of the independent publisher. With this legal
uncertainty, channelers are left to pay a supracompetitive price
or the price of litigation.
d. Complete Takedown & Exclusivity
Finally, returning to the EVO example,271 current practice
suggests that the game publisher can shut down any tournament
265. Id.
266. Shaw v. Dallas Cowboys Football Club, Ltd., 172 F.3d 299, 302 (3d Cir.
1999).
267. E.g., Jacob Wolf, Overwatch League To Be Streamed on Twitch.tv in
Two-Year, $90 Million Deal, ESPN (Jan. 12, 2018), http://www.espn.com/
esports/story/_/id/22015103/overwatch-league-broadcast-twitchtv-two-year-90
-million-deal [https://perma.cc/AN4M-BUW3] (reporting the deal between Activision-Blizzard and Twitch).
268. See supra note 52.
269. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1,
19 (1979).
270. See supra notes 87, 92 and accompanying text.
271. See supra notes 13–28 and accompanying text.
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that is operating without a license.272 When the game publisher
controls a league, there is an enormous benefit of exercising the
monopoly over the intellectual property and taking control of all
possible revenue. The publisher can simply refuse to deal and is
justified by the legitimate monopoly over its copyright. While
this benefit does not likely outweigh the alternatives of licensing
fees obtained from tournament revenues and exposure to a
larger audience,273 the risk nevertheless remains that the tournament’s broadcast could be entirely shut down with a simple
DMCA takedown notice of infringement and the tournament itself via a strongly-worded letter implying an incoming law suit
for infringement.274
In the end, despite a number of concerning practices possibly restraining trade or maintaining monopolization, publishercontrolled leagues have a number of justifications based in
sports antitrust jurisprudence and copyright law that may insulate the leagues from scrutiny. Table 1 summarizes these problematic practices and their justifications. Under these complimentary theories of competitive balance and copyright,
publisher-controlled leagues will be able to maintain the market
of self-regulation favoring deep control over the esports market
by the publisher.

272. See supra notes 13–28 and accompanying text.
273. For instance, it may behoove an American publisher to ignore an unlicensed tournament in South America if it brings new players to the game and
the publisher would otherwise be unable to tap into that area.
274. This is particularly true where esports depend upon online streaming
platforms such as Twitch which shut down first and ask later pursuant to the
DMCA safe harbor provisions.
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IP Medium

Justification

Restricting Supply
of Players to Competing Leagues and
Control Across Markets

Field of Use Restriction & License Revocation

Foster Pre-Professional Leagues &
Avoid Cross-Market
Encroachment

City-Based
Teams

Barriers to Entry &
Geographic Limits

Exclusive Geographic License

Drive Consumer Interest & Avoid Intraleague Encroachment

Pooled Broadcast Rights

Restricting Supply
to Channelers

Public Performance

Sale of Single Right
Necessary to Benefit from Copyright

Unique Tournament

Restricting Supply
to Consumers

DMCA
Takedown &
Refusal to Deal

Protection from Infringement

Table 1: Summary of Practices
C. PROBLEMS WITH LEAVING THE STATUS QUO
In the face of these practices, the esports industry nevertheless clamors for self-regulation, and one option is to leave the
status quo as is. On its face, it would appear that independent
tournament organizers are not suffering too poorly when over a
thousand tournaments occur each year.275 Furthermore, there
are very few instances of copyright abuse and publisher refusals
to license their game. In fact, self-regulation has been incredibly
beneficial to the esports industry whose growth has only accelerated in recent years.276
But this view of the industry is misleading and the risk of
copyright abuse to engage in anticompetitive practices is too
high to consider this to be a reasonable option. First, this view
ignores the top-heavy structure of tournament prize pools that
place the only economically-viable positions for professional

275. Christopher Ingraham, The Massive Popularity of Esports, in Charts,
WASH. POST (Aug. 27, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2018/
08/27/massive-popularity-esports-charts [https://perma.cc/AD3E-Q7ZQ].
276. Pannekeet, supra note 3.
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players in the publisher’s hands.277 Second, the game publisher
made a significant investment into developing an esports title,
perhaps with the very intention of monetizing competitive
play.278 The copyright system rewards that investment by giving
the publisher exclusivity rights over the intellectual property. If
history has anything to say, self-regulation will eventually break
down. Sports leagues eventually entered into dispute over player
salaries and congresspeople faced public pressure to bring
change.279 When the courts were asked to make the decisions,
they deferred to Congress280 or found the issues moot once league
lobbyists went to Congress.281 In the end, courts looked to Congress and Congress has either failed to understand the unique
economics of sports leagues, failed to act, or succumbed to unilateral lobbying pressure.282 Intellectual property flowing from
technology in esports concerns would only aggravate the problem. As investment in esports continues to increase,283 game
publishers may be seduced by copyright exclusivity and begin
enforcing the monopoly over their title with little to no hope for
effective intervention by the courts or Congress.
III. ESPORTS COMPETITION MODERNIZATION ACT:
COMPULSORY LICENSING AND COMPETING
COMPETITIONS
We would be happy with anything that would keep us out of the courts
and spell out the things that we have to have.
—Bert Bell, NFL Commissioner284

This final Part presents a solution based on the Music Modernization Act’s collective licensing management organization

277. Will Partin, The International Is Bad for Dota 2, KOTAKU (July 31,
2018), https://kotaku.com/the-international-is-bad-for-dota-2-1827996518
[https://perma.cc/RE3B-JMP4].
278. See Webster, supra note 18.
279. See supra Part I.C.
280. See, e.g., Toolson v. N.Y. Yankees, 346 U.S. 356, 357 (1953) (reserving
Congress’s role in determining the MLB’s antitrust exception).
281. See SURDAM, supra note 153, at 58.
282. See id. at 237–38.
283. Pannekeet, supra note 3.
284. SURDAM, supra note 153, at 93 (citing Organized Professional Sports
Teams: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust & Monopoly of the S. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 85th Cong. 415 (1958) (statement of Bert Bell, National Football League Commissioner)).
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and applies it to licensing within the esports industry. The esports industry must come together to Congress to propose a
trade-off: compulsory licensing for guaranteed compensation
and competition.285 The Music Modernization Act (MMA) serves
as roadmap for finding effective solutions to industries reliant on
licensing and self-regulation. Beginning with a discussion of music as an imperfect model for compulsory licensing and rate setting, this Note ultimately aspires to set forth what the esports
industry needs in order to stay out of the courts.
A. MUSIC AS A MODEL: ONLINE MUSIC STREAMING SERVICES &
COMPULSORY LICENSING
In a market equally dependent upon self-regulation, innovation, and copyright, the music industry revisited the pooled licensing and royalty collection problem in 2018. Songwriters
were not collecting royalties for the mechanical licenses when
sites such as Spotify and Apple Music streamed their work.286
Those platforms faced legal uncertainty in terms of possible infringement of the songwriter and artist copyrights over the
songs.287 But music fans continued to demand such services
without an effective and efficient means for those platforms to
obtain the appropriate licensure. Like the Spotify situation, current streamers, professional esports players, and tournaments
currently take an infringe-now-defend-later approach.288
The bipartisan Orrin G. Hatch-Bob Goodlatte Music Modernization Act of 2018 signaled a cease-fire to the war over the
licensing of music.289 The bill set forth a compulsory blanket licensing system managed by independent non-profit collective

285. This Note is not the first to recommend the compulsory licensing system. Yang Qiu suggested that a compulsory license may be used to settle the
debate over copyright ownership in streaming under Chinese law. Yang Qiu, A
Cure for Twitch: Compulsory License Promoting Vide Game Live-Streaming, 21
MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 31, 44–50 (2017).
286. Issues and Policy: Music Modernization Act, GRAMMY, https://www
.grammy.com/advocacy/issues-policy [https://perma.cc/C2C2-4EVX].
287. Id.
288. See supra Part II.B.1.
289. Dave Davis, Music Modernization Act of 2018 Becomes Law, COPYRIGHT CLEARANCE CTR. (Jan. 29, 2018), http://www.copyright.com/blog/music
-modernization-act-introduced-house-senate [https://perma.cc/4DWC-MQHF]
(last updated Oct. 11, 2018).
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management organization and a rate-setting board.290 The goal
was to create a more streamlined way to ensure music creators
collected royalties due from streaming sites.291 In effect, through
the system, music streaming services can play the music first,
then pay a statutorily-set fee per listen or a percentage of the
revenue, whichever is greater.292 In addition, the bill made several reforms to copyright law and provided a safe harbor for digital music services that reserved a sum of money for uncollected
royalties.293 The effects of the Act have not yet been seen, but the
industry has exhibited immense support and have faith in the
solution.294 While music publishers could not come together as
horizontal competitors to pool together licenses to offer to digital
service providers like Spotify, they came to Congress with the
genuine desire to solve the problem and created a statutory solution to music licensure. Now, digital service providers have access to millions of songs and content creators are guaranteed royalty payments through a third-party organization.
Unfortunately, the current cooperative atmosphere surrounding the MMA masks a more acrimonious debate over ratesetting that this solution necessarily implicates. In the end, digital streaming service providers want to pay as little as possible
for the license, and composers, publishers, Performance Rights
Organizations, and performers all want as much money as they
can get. Rate-setting litigation is contentious295 and the proposed
Esports Competition Modernization Act will necessarily import
this feature. Imperfect as it may be, the MMA, as will be shown,
is the most effective and least-invasive means of stopping potential copyright abuses in violation of antitrust laws.

290. Amy X. Wang, Trump Signs Landmark Music Bill into Law, ROL(Oct. 11, 2018), https://www.rollingstone.com/music/music-news/
trump-signs-music-modernization-act-736185 [https://perma.cc/JV7Q-2AV8].
291. Id.
292. Jeong, supra note 114.
293. Issues and Policy: Music Modernization Act, supra note 286; Wang, supra note 290.
294. Davis, supra note 289 (listing support of the Recording Industry Association of America, the National Music Publishers Association, and the National
Association of Broadcasters among others).
295. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COPYRIGHT AND THE MUSIC MARKETPLACE
91–94, 102–03 (2015), https://www.copyright.gov/docs/musiclicensingstudy/
copyright-and-the-music-marketplace.pdf [https://perma.cc/UW95-44VE].
LINGSTONE
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B. STATUTORY SOLUTION: ESPORTS COMPETITION
MODERNIZATION ACT
While this Note does not seek to write the entirety of an incredibly complex Congressional bill, it will develop a skeleton of
the absolute needs for the esports industry in order for the act to
be a success. These include (1) involvement of the industry, (2)
an opt-in system, (3) the non-exclusive rights, (4) compensation,
and (5) notice tied to (6) withdrawal rights.
The first of these needs is the participation of the entire esports industry. The esports industry, like music and traditional
sports before it, has existed through self-regulation. When Congress and regulators tried to impose their will upon traditional
sports, sports pushed back and used tactics to delay any significant changes to the industry.296 It is already a common refrain
that esports is unique and regulators would likely fail to consider
the specialized nature of the industry.297 To eliminate industry
pushback, the industry itself must be involved in the process.
The unique market must identify a unique solution. Organized
esports competitions cannot be addressed in tandem with other
intellectual property issues without running the risk of doing
more harm than good by introducing new concepts or overextending existing ones. The unique solution found by the music
industry—a streamlined compulsory licensing system—best
serves to solve the problem of publisher-controlled leagues and
downstream control without trampling over successful self-regulation.
Next, the industry needs to separate the wheat from the
chaff, the esports titles from the average video game. Under this
proposed Esports Competition Modernization Act, publishers
would choose to opt-in to the compulsory licensing system. Publisher-organized competitive play would only be allowed upon
opting-in. This selection could occur upon registration of the

296. See supra Part II.C.
297. See, e.g., David Philip Graham, Inviting Regulation: The Sportsificiation of Video Games¸ DPG AT LAW, https://www.dpgatlaw.com/2019/03/27/
inviting-regulation-the-sportsification-of-video-games/ [https://perma.cc/
7WVX-MRRE] (counseling esports clientele to avoid sports terminology to avoid
potential for regulation); Aaron Swerdlow, 4 Esports Regulations to Watch for
in 2018, VENTUREBEAT (May 8, 2018), https://venturebeat.com/2018/05/08/4
-esports-regulations-to-watch-for-in-2018 [https://perma.cc/XNQ8-KAX7] (discussing possible traditional sports-based regulations for esports).
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game with the Copyright Office. This system recognizes that control over the intellectual property remains with the publisher.
Because the publisher can choose when and whether to monetize
the competitive scene, publishers remain incentivized to develop
esports games without affecting non-esports titles.298 But, when
the publisher chooses to monetize the downstream esports market by forming a league, the publisher must do so on relative
equal footing with all other organizations wishing to organize
competitive playing of video games. The act cuts off downstream
control without making the publisher forfeit their copyright absolutely.
The core of the act would revolve around the rights of tournament operators—regardless of whether that tournament operator is the publisher or independent. The scope of the license
and conditions for obtaining one could be outlined using language from existing tournament licenses:
Section 1. Compulsory License to Tournament Operator — A person
complying with the provisions of this section may obtain a non-exclusive, non-transferable, limited, royalty-bearing license (“License”) to
use and display the software title[s] identified by you in the signup
form (the “Game(s)”) for inclusion in the Tournament. The License
shall include the following activities: (a) operate and use the Game(s)
during the Tournament; (b) publicly display and publicly perform the
Game(s) during the Tournament in a live Tournament venue; (c) live
online transmission or broadcast of the Tournament via web-based
video streaming services; (d) record all Tournament games, and distribute and sublicense such recording for later private linear viewing
via web-based video streaming services; and (e) promote the use of the
Game(s) in connection with the Tournament.299

Each word in this grant is important. It must be non-exclusive so as to promote competitions among tournament operators.
The license must be non-transferable to prevent free-riders from
not complying with the other conditions set forth in the act. It is
limited to tournament play and the broadcast thereof; it does not
extend to the game itself. To be exact, it gives all of the rights to
operate and monetize a tournament, but nothing more.

298. Note too that this trade-off necessarily means that the proposed act is
inapplicable to the debate over other interactions with the game, such as the
creation of Let’s Plays videos discussed in Coogan, supra note 79, and Hagen,
supra note 96.
299. Dota 2 Tournament License and Paid Spectator Service Agreement, supra note 26 (using similar language).
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With the tournament operators happy with the license
scope, game publishers must also be happy with the royalty rate.
Independent tournament operators could agree to a royalty arrangement to obtain a compulsory license for any number of esports titles through a rate-setting board.300 One means of calculating the royalty would be a percentage of the revenue from
the tournament or a set amount per view and attendee. This
“Spotifyication” of esports would adequately compensate the
publisher for its possible lost revenue that would be gained
through enforcement of its copyright exclusivity. Outside of the
collection of royalties and the adjudication of disputes related
thereto, the board should not have any oversight capacity. Again,
this balances the need to establish a rate with the industry’s desire to remain in control. Who better to determine the rate for
such a license than the industry itself?
There will also need to be a trade-off of notice requirements
for tournament reservations and opting-out. First, the tournament operator must notify the game publisher 180 days before
the tournament is set to take place. Notice should include the
identity of the tournament operator, the dates of the tournament
or league (which may last no longer than one year), the anticipated number of competitors, and a general description of the
event. This notice would secure the license for a set tournament,
which would need to be renewed for each subsequent tournament. Second, the publisher must give 180 days-notice before
withdrawing a game from the compulsory licensing scheme. The
decision to allow for retraction is likely controversial. After all,
one of the greatest worries is that tournament operators will
have invested significant resources into a tournament when the
game publisher can take it all away. But withdrawal is necessary under the U.S. copyright system that recognizes the inherent right of the author over one’s work. The copyright owner
should never permanently lose control over the work until it enters the public domain.301
300. The creation of a rate-setting board prompts the question of whether it
would be necessary for the tournament operators to then create a collective
management organization in order to effectively bargain for better terms. See
generally Allen, supra note 102 (arguing that a collective management organization could mitigate the unequal bargaining power between the publisher and
the players and tournament organizers).
301. For a defense of the withdrawal mechanism, see Qiu, supra note 285,
at 49, 53–54 (explaining why it is unlikely that all game publishers would cancel
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In the end, the Esports Competition Modernization Act
would allow industry participants to secure the stability it has
so desperately sought since its inception in the 1970s by eliminating risk of infringement and enforcement by the publisher.
Courts and Congress have yet to adequately lay out the protections inherent in video games and the limitations to those protections, e.g., fair use in the video game and esports context. In
a compulsory licensing schema, the licensee would pay for the
rights—regardless of what the courts ultimately decide about
those rights—and be free from worry of disruption by the publisher. Giving stability to the tournaments would incentivize additional investment. Sponsors would no longer worry about a title being pulled from a tournament or a league and its teams
ceasing to exist. In turn, tournament operators would pass on
the benefits of increased investment to the consumers. Players,
too, would have more certainty and job security in independent
leagues: licensees would compete for teams who would compete
for players and, in turn, salaries would become competitive.
This effectively implements the interleague competition of
competing competitions critique. Publishers can run a league so
long it gives up the right to exclude competition. More than a
single championship will take place as each league is independent of the others. Consumers would then choose to support any
tournament to spectate instead of only having the publisher-controlled league. It does not, however, inherently imply the intraleague open-architecture structure. A league does not need a relegation system under this compulsory license. The teams could
be “permanent” within a league, as they are with ones today. But
leagues would compete with each other for players. If a league
fails to perform, players could switch into a more beneficial
league, possibly dragging along consumer interest. This creates
a hybrid model of competing competitions that emphasizes competition among tournaments and leagues.
As for the anticompetitive conduct discussed, most of the issues are avoided under the Esports Competition Modernization
the license and that the right of cancellation is necessary to create balance).
With the introduction of a withdrawal mechanic, the act introduces an element
of gamesmanship. For instance, if the publisher and a tournament operator
launch leagues at the same time and the independent operator is more successful immediately, the publisher is incentivized to withdraw its title, wait until
the public has forgotten, and opt back in when the publisher is more prepared.
Time limits to opting back in after opting out can deter this behavior.
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Act. Players could not be banned from playing in a competing
league so long as they operate within the scope of the compulsory
license. Due to the increase in demand for players, leagues will
compete with each other by providing the least restrictive league
bylaws. Territorial monopolies are impossible to grant because
another league represents competition within the territory.
Pooled broadcasting rights no longer fall solely within the hands
of the publisher, but in the hands of all licensees. Finally, the
compulsory license removes the publisher’s ability to pull a title
at the last minute. While it should be allowed for the publisher
to revoke its acceptance of the compulsory licensing guidelines,
only future licenses should be affected.
C. COMPETING SOLUTIONS FOR PUBLISHER-CONTROLLED
LEAGUES: GOVERNANCE, COPYRIGHT, AND ANTITRUST
Academics have discussed three alternative solutions to addressing the anticompetitive effects of intellectual property licensing by publisher-controlled leagues: leave regulation of the
industry to an independent governance body, modify copyright
of video games to limit publisher control, and leave parties to
test antitrust concerns in the courts. Each solution has critical
flaws that render it ineffective in tackling the entire problem of
downstream control by publisher-controlled leagues.
Laura Chao proposed a regulatory and governance body to
provide oversight of esports.302 Recognizing the legitimate parallels between sports and esports economics, Chao argued that an
independent pan-esports governing body should be used to set
minimum standards for consumers, players, teams, and
leagues.303 She also rightfully pointed out that such an independent agency could facilitate the negotiation and sale of content distribution agreements.304 But, her solution does not engage with the intricacies of copyright licensing. Governance
would have a chilling effect but would not prevent the publisher
from banning players in competing leagues, granting territorial
exclusivity to particular teams, licensing exclusive content to a
particular distributor, or refusing to license to competing tournament operators. Furthermore, said governing body could be

302. Chao, supra note 8, at 761.
303. Id. at 761–63.
304. Id.
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subject to regulatory capture. Given that the publishers currently have the largest economic weight to throw, the governance body will end up a rubber stamp for publisher-benefitting
practices.305 Finally, a pan-esports governing body is in direct
contrast with the industry’s preference for publisher-regulation
of its titles and self-regulation as a whole: governance from
above is not palatable.
If not governance, many have suggested that the root of the
issue is the ambiguity of copyright protections afforded to rights
holders over video games, and that statutory or judicial interpretation placing limits on those rights could rectify the problem.
The reform would take place through the arguments previously
discussed: interactivity creating independent copyright, transformative fair use, and copyright misuse.306 Harttung307 and Hagen308 believe that fair use provides the most likely solution for
online broadcasts of video games in particular. The fair use argument has gained the most traction, but it would be the equivalent of hammering in a screw. Modifying an already tortured
doctrine permitting quite a bit of user-generated content to fit
the unique situation of esports would likely do more harm than
good. Furthermore, placing reliance on defensive measures still
leaves putative infringers on the hook for the risks of litigation.
Finally, finding fair use for online broadcast of video games
would disincentivize publishers from creating additional esports
titles. This runs contrary to copyright’s constitutional goal of
promoting innovation.
Finally, Miroff argues that antitrust law already provides
an adequate vehicle for limiting anticompetitive conduct by publisher-controlled leagues.309 In his article, he outlines a tying
claim against a publisher-controlled league for its misuse of copyright in the downstream esports markets.310 While it is true
that antitrust law provides an effective means of finding limits
to copyright licensing arrangements by publisher-controlled
leagues, his failure to engage with sports antitrust history limits
305. See Miroff, supra note 8, at 220 (claiming that Chao’s solution would
only aggravate anticompetitive practices).
306. See supra Part I.B.2.
307. Harttung, supra note 11.
308. Hagen, supra note 96, at 273.
309. Miroff, supra note 8, at 186.
310. Id. at 210–12.
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its applicability. The culture of self-regulation and industry
pushback adopted from traditional sports will effectively delay
applicability of antitrust until the economic practices become entrenched. Worst of all, the monitoring costs of his solution fall on
the smaller stakeholders within the esports market: the independent tournament operators. Bearing the costs of suit is not in
the short-term interest of these organizations, particularly so
long as the publishers act benevolently.
What has not been discussed is the possibility of taking a
play from the music industry’s playbook. Music, like esports, is
an industry dependent on copyright licensing and self-regulation. Consumer demand for esports content continues to climb,
thereby incentivizing quick capitalization by entrepreneurs.311
Like the music industry did to find a statutory solution to the
mass licensing of digital media, all of the various esports participants must come to Congress and self-regulate one final time.
The process of the Music Modernization Act and the solution of
compulsory licensing effectively takes ideas native to the sports
and intellectual property arenas to create an esports regime that
satisfies antitrust concerns through competing competitions.
Critics of this solution would rightfully point out that the
Music Modernization Act is a risky basis for problem-solving.
when the effects of the streamlined system have yet to be seen.
There are numerous distinctions between the music and video
game industries that may caution against such an import. Importantly, esports do not face the numbers problem that music
faces and that necessitated the compulsory licensing solution: it
is still economically feasible for a tournament operator to contract with every publisher.312 The solution is not perfect: just like
sports antitrust does not map perfectly onto the esports issues,
music does not do so either. In the end, although the compulsory
licensing system may not be justified by the sheer number of actors, like in music, it can be justified on the need to address antitrust concerns laid down in this Note. And while the specific

311. Pannekeet, supra note 3.
312. This is distinguishable from the concerns raised by Allen, supra note
102, at 227–28, about the impracticality of the publisher contracting with all
streamers. The number of independent tournament operators are necessarily
fewer than the number of streamers.
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effects of the Music Modernization Act have yet to be seen, compulsory licensing in music and rate-setting has a longer history
that justifies their use.
Additionally, critics of the proposed Esports Competition
Modernization Act can claim that publishers will still come up
with invidious ways to maintain control over the league.313 True,
the game publisher has unique access to the game, its client, and
its balance system. But, the crux of the proposed act is to put the
independent tournament operator and publisher tournament operator on a more level playing field with regards to the mere ability to organize play. The publisher could not introduce new functions or characters in the game without giving access to
licensees.314 The publisher could not force others to play on older
versions of the game without subjecting itself to the same limitations. The only advantage left becomes advance knowledge of
game balance and changes, which should not impact the heart of
competing competitions.
In the end, an Esports Competition Modernization Act could
be developed by industry participants in order to address the
risk from legal ambiguity and downstream publisher control.
Drawing from a solution prevalent in both sports antitrust and
copyright domains, the proposed act would create a compulsory
licensing system that negates the publisher’s ability to monopolize a title while compensating the entity for its loss. At the same
time, the proposed act would also reinforce the stability of the
industry by allowing independent tournaments to thrive, creat-

313. The author would like to thank Ross Abbott for discussing means of
imposing disadvantage on independent tournament operators.
314. There is, however, an unresolved question as to whether the act should
go beyond the gameplay protected by copyright and extend to the means of viewing the gameplay, which could be protected under patent law. See supra note 73
and accompanying text. If it does not extend that far, this may lead to a reverseengineering question similar to the one presented in Sega Enterprises, Ltd. v.
Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1527–28 (9th Cir. 1992) (finding fair use of reverse-engineering of Sega game to make Sega-compatible games) and Sony
Computer Entertainment v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596, 610 (9th Cir.) (finding fair use of reverse-engineering Sony games to make a computer-compatible
version to compete against the PlayStation), cert denied 531 U.S. 871 (2000), if
the independent tournament operator must disassemble the game to determine
how it can spectate matches. To the extent that the finished product incorporates copyrightable elements of the game, the compulsory license should shield
against claims of infringement.
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ing competition for professional players, and giving the basic certainty that the industry is not reliant upon a single benevolent
overlord: the publisher.
CONCLUSION
This Note highlighted the danger of publisher-controlled esports leagues and downstream control by illustrating how copyright licensing can lead to historically-recognized sports antitrust issues. Coupling copyright considerations and antitrust
arguments effectively outlines the strong justifications publishers can use to maintain the status quo in their favor. After considering the impact of player restrictions, territorial divisions,
pooled broadcasting rights, and publisher exclusivity, this Note
recommends adopting a compulsory licensing system based on
the Music Modernization Act. The solution would cut off the publisher’s downstream control in the industry while compensating
it for such loss. This solution is less invasive than an oversight
committee, more targeted than statutory amendments to copyright law, and more reliable than leaving it to the courts to discuss the complex antitrust considerations.
Esports will lead to a reconsideration of decades of precedent
and practice. Whether it be in antitrust law, copyright law, or
other fields, it will be necessary to determine if esports is enlightening or aberrational in the view of the law. This Note used
publisher-controlled leagues to shine light on potential anticompetitive conduct through copyright licensing, but the greater implication is a reconsideration of the current antitrust exemptions
and excuses for traditional sports. Sports slipped into exceptions
as it matured into the national pastime. As esports continue to
mature, the questions remain: is it time for regulation and when
is it too late?

